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Executive Summary
Since the fall of Suharto’s New Order regime in 1998, Indonesia has
launched a number of initiatives to reform its previously omnipotent
armed forces. The extent to which these reforms have resulted in real polit-
ical change, however, has been subject to heated debate in Indonesia and
in capitals of Western donor countries. The two camps have often
advanced highly antagonistic accounts of the military reform process.
Human rights groups and political activists, on the one hand, have con-
tended that despite formal reforms, there has been almost no change in the
way the armed forces operate. They maintain that the military continues
to influence, and even dominate, political and economic affairs. The
opposing view, which is frequently argued by foreign proponents of restor-
ing full military-to-military ties with Indonesia, states that the armed
forces are now fully subordinated to civilian democratic control, and that
substantial progress has been made in imposing international human
rights standards on the troops.
This study presents an evaluation of military reform efforts in
Indonesia eight years after Suharto’s resignation. Applying the two-gener-
ation model of military reform developed by Cottey, Edmunds, and
Forster, its proposes that Indonesia has made remarkable progress in
advancing first-generation military reforms, which include extensive
changes to the country’s institutional framework, judicial system, electoral
mechanisms, composition of representative bodies, and the responsibilities
of security agencies. In combination, these reforms have successfully
extracted the armed forces from formal politics, have undermined many of
their institutional privileges, and have produced a polity in which the mil-
itary arguably no longer holds “veto power” to overturn decisions made by
the civilian government. The compliance of the armed forces with the gov-
ernment’s most recent peace plan for Aceh, despite extensive skepticism
within the ranks, is a persuasive example of change.
These successes, however, have been counterbalanced by serious omis-
sions and failures. Most important, policymakers did not proceed with
initiatives to reform the territorial command structure. These reforms
were aborted shortly after they were launched in 2000 amid increasing
political tensions. Thus the territorial system was maintained as the power
base of the armed forces in the regions, allowing them to tap into econom-
ic resources at the grassroots and defend their role as a significant player
in local politics. In the same vein, none of the post-Suharto administra-
tions seriously tackled the issue of military self-financing. Since its incep-
tion in the 1940s, the Indonesian military has raised much of its own
funds through a large network of businesses, cooperatives, foundations,
and other formal and informal enterprises. These fund-raising mecha-
nisms, in turn, have enabled the armed forces to operate from a position
in which they are not exclusively dependent on budget allocations from
the state. Despite efforts to increase state control over the defense budget
after 1998, the military has continued to rely on large amounts of off-
budget funds. Under such conditions, the process of establishing effective
and democratic civilian control over the military cannot be completed. 
The failure to subject the armed forces irreversibly to democratic
civilian control has been due to several factors. First, prominent military
officers around General Wiranto had played a key role in organizing a
controlled transfer of power from Suharto to his deputy, B. J. Habibie, in
May 1998, avoiding the complete collapse of the New Order regime and
securing the armed forces extensive participation in the first postauthor-
itarian government. As a result, the military was granted the authority to
define its own internal reform agenda, enabling it to fend off demands for
more substantial change.
Second, the deep fragmentation within Indonesia’s civilian elite assist-
ed the military in gaining concessions from political leaders eager to pull
the armed forces to their side and outplay opponents in their struggle for
power. The divisions between key societal and political figures had already
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been clearly visible in the turmoil that led to Suharto’s fall, but they
widened in 1999 and finally brought the country to the brink of a consti-
tutional breakdown in 2001. The chaos surrounding the impeachment of
President Wahid led to a serious loss of public confidence in civilian lead-
ership skills, and facilitated the rise of retired military officers as top con-
tenders for political office. In 2002 and 2003, former generals defended
their hold on key governorships in Java and other important provinces,
despite the fact that civilian political parties controlled large majorities in
the legislatures that elected them. In 2004, the presidential race featured
three contenders with a military background, and resulted in Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono’s ascension to the presidency.
Third, the perception in large sections of society that the political
and economic reforms introduced after 1998 had not significantly
improved their daily lives gave rise to an anti-reform sentiment that also
affected initiatives for change in the armed forces. More specifically, con-
cerns over sectarian clashes in Maluku, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi, as well
as continued separatist violence in Aceh and Papua, led many politicians
to conclude that further experiments with military reform were likely to
undermine the capability of the armed forces to deal with the unrest. As
conservative notions of unitarianism and territorial integrity replaced the
liberal euphoria of the immediate post-Suharto period, the majority of
Indonesian decision-makers dropped military reform from their list of
urgent policy items.
Fourth, there was strong institutional resistance within the armed
forces toward reforms that threatened their core interests. While accepting
its phased extraction from formal politics, the military put up fierce oppo-
sition towards plans to reform the territorial command structure, and tried
to circumvent government initiatives to take control of military business-
es. Officers in favor of gradually disbanding the territorial system were
sidelined by their colleagues, and the armed forces leadership took every
opportunity to consolidate, and even expand, their network of local com-
mands. One such opportunity was the government’s fight against terror,
which encouraged senior generals to reinstate the intelligence functions of
low-level units that had been shelved after 1998.
The hybrid nature of Indonesia’s military reform  presents Indonesian
and foreign policymakers with a set of difficult challenges. Domestic
politicians are confronted with the task of producing a blueprint for mod-
ernizing Indonesia’s outdated defense system, which had been designed in
the 1940s to defeat the Dutch by guerilla warfare. This blueprint poten-
tially would see the current territorial system replaced by a number of
multiservice bases at strategic points of the archipelago, with the capacity
to rapidly deploy troops to crisis spots. Indonesian politicians should also
pursue several reforms that would lead to improvements to the human
rights courts and military justice system, the clear subordination of the
military to the Department of Defense, and the creation of a civilian-led
National Security Council. Foreign donors, on the other hand, have
learned since Suharto’s fall that isolating the Indonesian armed forces has
not triggered more extensive reforms. Instead, the decision of many
Western countries to suspend military-to-military ties with Indonesia in
1999 has hardened the nationalist resolve within the officer corps and has
driven it closer to China and Russia. Consequently, a course of limited
engagement is advised that helps Indonesia strengthen its air force and
navy vis-à-vis the army, and ultimately leads to a more professional and
accountable military within Indonesia’s new democratic framework.
x Marcus Mietzner
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The Politics of 
Military Reform in 
Post-Suharto Indonesia:
Elite Conflict, Nationalism,
and Institutional Resistance
Eight years after the fall of President Suharto, analysts of Indonesian pol-
itics remain deeply divided when discussing the military’s political power
in the postauthoritarian polity. Some observers argue that the armed
forces, or TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National
Military), have lost much of their influence on the political process, have
improved their professional standards and human rights record, and have
been largely subjected to civilian control. John Bradford, for instance, has
lauded TNI’s decision “to disengage from practical politics and focus on
improving its war-making abilities, especially those related to external
defense” (Bradford 2005: 19). The opposing view states that the reforms
undertaken since 1998 have been mostly ceremonial and ineffective, leav-
ing the military with enough power to secure its main institutional inter-
ests. Writing in 2003, William Liddle concluded that there is “a slowly
dawning recognition that nothing fundamental has in fact changed since
1998” (Liddle 2003).
The debate regarding the level of TNI’s depoliticization and internal
reform is not only an important academic discourse on post-Suharto
Indonesia. It is also mirrored in the policy discussions of foreign govern-
ments about their engagement with Indonesia’s armed forces. The govern-
ments of the United States and Australia in particular have found it hard
to determine whether TNI has met
their benchmarks as far as access to
their military assistance programs is
concerned. There have been influen-
tial public campaigns in both coun-
tries against any support to TNI
before clear and irreversible steps
toward reform have been made. In
October 2004, forty-five members of
Congress wrote to then-Secretary of
State Colin Powell that TNI remained
“a massively corrupt institution,” and
much of its income “comes from illegal and semi-legal activities, including
prostitution, drug-dealing, environmentally destructive logging, and traf-
ficking in people” (East Timor Action Network/U.S. 2004). The propo-
nents of military-to-military ties with Indonesia, on the other hand, have
maintained that Jakarta’s military has
already achieved the necessary levels
of reform that qualify it for foreign
assistance. Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld, for example, stated
in 2002 that Indonesia’s armed forces
“are addressing the human rights
issues in an orderly, democratic way,”
and called on Congress to review the
conditions it had set for providing aid
to TNI (U.S. Department of Defense
News Briefing 2002). Using its authority to waive certain congressional
requirements, the Bush administration finally lifted the restrictions in
November 2005.
This study discusses the process of military reform in Indonesia from
the final days of Suharto’s regime to the government under Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono. It will highlight achievements in the reform effort, but also
point to unresolved problems, and even regression, in some crucial areas.
Although important institutional changes were implemented between
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1998 and 2002, the process of reform has largely stagnated since then.
This stagnation was due to several key developments in post-Suharto civil-
military relations. These include the manner in
which the 1998 regime-change occurred, the
deep fragmentation among the civilian political
elite, the rising nationalist-conservative ideolo-
gy of political leaders and society as a whole,
and the institutional resistance offered by vested
interests within the armed forces. Most impor-
tant, the interplay between these various themes
explains why core issues of military reform, like
the territorial command structure and the problem of military self-financ-
ing, were not dealt with early on in the political transition and remain
unaddressed today.    
The extent of reform will be evaluated utilizing comparative models
of democratic control over the armed forces, most notably the scholarly
debate on different “generations” of reforms. In general terms, recent lit-
erature on the subject has differentiated between two generations of
change. Most countries that have initiated democratic reform after long
periods of military-backed, authoritarian rule begin the transitional
process with changes to their institutional framework: abolition of securi-
ty institutions associated with the old regime, establishment of new civil-
ian bodies to control the armed forces, changes to the command system,
and empowerment of parliament. This first phase of institutional measures
is typically termed the “first generation” of civil-military reforms (Cottey,
Edmunds, and Forster 2001: 5). The first generation of reforms is impor-
tant for the dismantling of old power structures and for defining the end
goal of the democratic transition.
The first-generation reform agenda is insufficient, however, to address
capacity problems of the newly created institutions and to control residual
powers the armed forces may be able to exercise through noninstitutional
political networks (Herd and Tracy 2005). Political institutions charged
with military oversight, as well as civil society groups that aspire to the role
of “watchdogs,” can only function properly if they have the capacity to ful-
fill their tasks. Lack of expertise, experience, funds, infrastructure, sup-
porting staff, technology, and information can cause even highly sophisti-
cated institutional frameworks to collapse or simply become dysfunction-
al. Accordingly, the second generation of reforms is crucial. The second
the process of reform
has largely stagnated
since [2002]
b
generation consolidates the frameworks for oversight of the military that
were created in the first; in other words, it provides the democratic sub-
stance to the institutional structures established by political decisions.
Thus the challenge of the second-generation reforms is centered around
building capacity of both state institutions and civil society in exercising
democratic civilian control over the military.
The two-generation model of military reform can make a useful con-
tribution to the discussion of Indonesia’s post-Suharto initiatives to estab-
lish executive supremacy over the armed forces. Many of the institutional
changes prescribed by the first-generation agenda have been implemented
since 1998, such as the extraction of the armed forces from political insti-
tutions and the empowerment of the legisla-
ture to carry out its oversight functions more
effectively. But the underlying power struc-
tures that had underpinned military engage-
ment in politics since 1945 have been
remarkably resistant to change and thus pre-
vented Indonesia from completing the first
generation of reforms and proceeding to the
second. In this regard, several important fea-
tures of military involvement in postindepen-
dence politics and society continue to
obstruct more substantial reform measures in
today’s democratic polity. Among them are
the persistence of the territorial command structure, institutionalized in
the late 1950s to anchor the armed forces deeply in the economic and
political infrastructure of the regions; the military’s relative autonomy from
central government funding, generated by its vast network of off-budget
sources that has been in place since the independence war of the late 1940s;
its entrenchment in political institutions under Sukarno’s Guided
Democracy (1959–65) and the New Order (1966–98), which consolidat-
ed a sense of the military’s entitlement to participation in government; the
effective impunity of the officer corps from legal prosecution, rooted in its
political dominance in various Indonesian regimes and a military justice
code dating back to the 1940s; and a general feeling in the ranks that with-
out its intervention in politics, civilian leaders will tamper with the very
territorial integrity of the state that the generals allegedly fought so hard to
achieve and preserve. This complex of socially entrenched privileges and
4 Marcus Mietzner
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perceived prerogatives, which defined the “starting point” for military
reform after Suharto’s fall, severely complicated attempts to subordinate
the armed forces firmly to postauthoritarian control institutions.
In order to highlight the successes and failures of the reform process,
this essay presents a chronologically structured survey of events in crucial
periods of Indonesia’s democratic transition. This approach was chosen for
a number of reasons. To begin with, each of the periods discussed, from
the crisis of the late New Order polity to the four post-Suharto govern-
ments, had a very distinct, and highly diverse, influence on the develop-
ment of post-1998 civil-military relations. Each period left important
legacies for their respective successors to tackle, forming causally intercon-
nected junctures in the transitional process. The narrative emphasis on
such junctures can therefore capture the dynamics of the military reform
process better than a theme-oriented approach that provides snapshots of
the current situation, and allows for a much more precise identification of
the key achievements, omissions, and events that have shaped post-
Suharto military politics. Understanding the stagnation of military reform
efforts during the Megawati government (2001–04), for example, is
impossible without a detailed discussion of the reasons for the dramatic
failure of radical reform initiatives launched under the Wahid administra-
tion (1999–2001). In the same vein, explaining the success of the
Yudhoyono government (since 2004) in enforcing the adherence of the
military to its peace plan in Aceh would remain fragmentary without out-
lining the factors that had allowed the armed forces only two years earlier
to undermine the “cessation of hostilities” agreement negotiated under
Megawati’s rule. 
In its discussion of the various periods, the essay develops five key
arguments. First, the character of the 1998 regime change predetermined
many of the difficulties Indonesia would face in reforming its post-Suharto
military. Facilitated by military officers close to General Wiranto, the
intrasystemic transfer of power from Suharto to
his deputy avoided the complete destruction of
the regime and allowed many of its key compo-
nents, including the armed forces, to make a
relatively smooth transfer into the new polity.
Second, based on compromises made between
the first postauthoritarian government and the
military leadership in 1998, the armed forces
the territorial
command structure…
was left untouched
b
were granted the right to define and implement their own internal reforms.
This led to the omission of important items from the reform agenda, most
notably the territorial command structure, which was left untouched for
much of the immediate post-New Order period. Third, the deep fragmen-
tation of civilian politics, which had already marked the crisis of 1998, had
a tremendous impact on the evolution of civil-military relations after
Suharto’s fall. This became most evident during the Wahid presidency,
when a courageous program for wide-ranging military reform collapsed
amid severe conflicts between the country’s largest political and societal
forces. Fourth, this protracted civilian infighting, which brought Indonesia
to the brink of a constitutional breakdown in 2001, led not only to a gen-
eral erosion of public confidence in civilian leadership, but also assisted in
the emergence of retired military officers as prominent political players at
the local and national level. Fifth, growing concerns over the threat of
national disintegration and the rise of international terrorism after 2001
provided additional disincentives for Indonesia to proceed with more sub-
stantial military reforms. Thus despite President Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono’s determination to rein in the armed forces during the Aceh
peace process and initiate changes to their financing system, the efforts for
structural military reform remain an uncompleted project.
Building on these five central arguments, the monograph evaluates the
state of military reform in Indonesia against indicators and propositions in
the literature on democratic transitions in general and military reform in
particular. Comparing Indonesia to countries in similar stages of their
postauthoritarian transitions, the author argues that Jakarta can claim a
medium rank on the international scale of civil-military reforms. It is far
ahead of states that have seen their reform processes disintegrate in politi-
cal decline and even armed conflict, but lags behind countries that have
begun to institutionalize effective mechanisms to exercise democratic civil-
ian control over their militaries. The monograph concludes with policy
recommendations for domestic and international decision-makers.
Suharto’s Fall: Implications for Military Reform after 1998
The discussion of the 1998 regime change, and the role senior military
officers played in it, is crucial for understanding post-New Order civil-mil-
itary relations. Many of the difficulties in reforming the postauthoritarian
armed forces can be traced to the way the military transitioned from the
New Order into the new democratic polity. Of utmost significance was the
6 Marcus Mietzner
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fact that a number of military leaders around then-Armed Forces
Commander General Wiranto1 and Chief of Staff of Socio-Political Affairs
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had concluded by April 1998 that Suharto’s
position was indefensible, and had actively engaged in the elite negotia-
tions that encouraged the embattled autocrat to resign (Lee 2005a and
2005b; Shiraishi 1999: 82). The actions of Wiranto and Yudhoyono stood
in stark contrast to more hard-line elements in the armed forces that tried
to convince Suharto to declare martial law and order a violent crackdown
on government dissidents. These hardliners, which included Suharto’s son-
in-law Prabowo Subianto, former Armed Forces Commander Feisal
Tanjung, and former Army Chief of Staff Hartono, had cultivated close
ties to militant Islamic networks and were prepared to mobilize them in
Suharto’s defense (Hefner 2000: 151; Schwarz 2004: 337). Their efforts
ultimately failed, however, as even Suharto accepted that the chances of
prolonging his rule were minimal. The student movement had rapidly
gained momentum, and a growing number of previous New Order loyal-
ists had turned their backs on Suharto. Isolated from the rest of society and
deserted by former loyalists, Suharto rejected the offers by hardline officers
to declare a state of emergency, and instead opted for a controlled transfer
of power within the constitutional format of the regime. This intrasys-
temic character of the regime change, in turn, allowed residual elements of
the New Order to form the first post-Suharto administration.
The ascension of Vice President B. J. Habibie to the helm of govern-
ment on May 20, 1998, ended almost four decades of authoritarian rule,
but it avoided a sharp break with the political power structures that had
underpinned the regime. Consequently, key components of the New
Order, and particularly the armed forces, were able to extend some of their
privileges and informal powers into the new political system. This aspect
of the negotiated regime change becomes evident if contrasted with the
potential consequences had emergency law been imposed. The declaration
of martial law, as demanded by a small number of hardline military offi-
cers, almost certainly would have led to a further escalation of protests and
increased use of military coercion against demonstrators (Emmerson
2004: 106). This scenario was unlikely to secure Suharto’s long-term polit-
ical survival, but could have resulted in the kind of tumultuous regime col-
lapse that, according to Stepan and Linz (1996: 52–53), typically elevates
oppositional forces to replace “sultanistic” rulers. In short, the controlled
regime change spared Indonesia the tragedy of a Tiananmen-style mas-
sacre, but sent the country on a more complicated course of democratic
transition than states that witnessed their autocratic regimes implode amid
anarchic unrest.
There were, of course, other important reasons for the intrasystemic
character of the regime change. A particularly prominent factor was the
fragmentation among Indonesia’s civilian politicians, which would also
leave its mark on the scope and pace of mil-
itary reform after 1998. Throughout the cri-
sis, the leaders of large societal and political
organizations failed to form a united oppo-
sition front against the government, leaving
the initiative for regime change to the force-
ful, but rather unorganized student move-
ment. Accordingly, when Suharto finally
fell, no credible team of nonregime figures
stood ready to take his place. Instead, bureaucrats and politicians associat-
ed with the crumbled regime were the main beneficiaries of the transfer of
power facilitated by senior military officers. 
The disunity among the civilian political elite during the crisis not
only prevented the complete collapse of the regime, but also anticipated
the political conflict lines of the post-Suharto era. Abdurrahman Wahid,
patron of the traditionalist Muslim organization Nahdlatul Ulama (NU),
refused to align himself with the opposition against Suharto and even
attacked the student movement for its unwillingness to compromise with
the regime (Mietzner 1998). Deeply distrustful of politicians who did not
share his own politico-ideological positions, Wahid developed a belligerent
style that would become a major factor in the political conflicts of the
postauthoritarian transition. Amien Rais, on the other hand, the chairman
of the modernist Islamic group Muhammadiyah, had emerged as Suharto’s
most radical opponent. After 1998, he unsuccessfully tried to use his lead-
ership credentials won during the crisis to boost his own presidential ambi-
tions. On the nationalist end of the political spectrum, Megawati
Sukarnoputri isolated herself from the developments leading to Suharto’s
fall, rejecting all invitations to join the active opposition. As daughter of
founding president Sukarno, she apparently believed that she had a legiti-
mate claim to Suharto’s succession. These huge gaps between Indonesia’s
leading politicians prevented the formation of the very “unity of democrat-
ic purpose among civilian political elites” that Diamond and Plattner
8 Marcus Mietzner
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(1996: xxiv) have postulated as a crucial condition for ending military
intervention in politics and creating democratic civil-military relations in
postauthoritarian transitions.
The negotiated regime change not only helped former New Order
protagonists to survive Suharto’s demise. The fact that officers around
Wiranto had prevailed over the proponents of martial law also shaped per-
ceptions within society and the political elite about the urgency of reform-
ing the military in the post-Suharto era. Prabowo Subianto and his close
associate Muchdi Purwopranjono, who were responsible for kidnapping
regime opponents in early 1998, and who were widely believed to have
been involved in the Jakarta riots that preceded Suharto’s resignation, were
relieved of their commands and subsequently discharged from the mili-
tary.2 These dismissals, it appeared, temporarily satisfied public demands
for change in the armed forces and eased societal pressure for a more wide-
ranging replacement of the New Order military leadership. The officers
close to Wiranto, for their part, had helped to negotiate Suharto’s resigna-
tion, and thus were initially not counted among the most challenging hur-
dles for a successful democratic transition. 
Consequently, unlike South Korea, for example, which witnessed a
substantial military reshuffle during its political transition, Indonesia did
not begin its postautocratic reform project by retiring the military top
brass associated with the old regime (Jun 2001: 130). Instead, the officers
left in charge of leading the military’s internal reform efforts had, despite
their role in facilitating Suharto’s departure, long histories of personal
attachment to the fallen ruler and the political paradigms he represented. 
The ambiguous attitude of the officers around Wiranto and
Yudhoyono toward political change in general and military reform in par-
ticular was highlighted by the substantial differences between them.
Several officers in Yudhoyono’s circle had been discussing military reform
concepts since the late 1980s (Honna 2003: 74–81), while Wiranto had
only reluctantly warmed up to the notion that the New Order’s political
format was anachronistic, and that the military itself had to assimilate to
trends of political change. It was only the escalation of the crisis, with its
obvious features of rapid economic and political decline, which had forced
Wiranto to integrate ideas of regime change into his conceptual thinking
(Liddle 1999: 28). Before that, he had viewed Yudhoyono and other
reformist officers like Agus Widjojo and Agus Wirahadikusumah as help-
ful allies in his conflict with Prabowo, but had considered their thinking
about political liberalization and disengagement from the regime as too
radical.3 Thus for Wiranto, the leap from defending his patron Suharto to
assisting in his resignation had exhausted much of his willingness to
accommodate political reform. Beyond that, he had not paid much
thought to the design of a postauthoritarian system and the way the mili-
tary would operate in it. The officers around Yudhoyono, on the other
hand, appeared better prepared to engage with the new polity, although
they too were overwhelmed by the suddenness of Suharto’s departure and
the forcefulness of the reform movement that had triggered it.4 The divid-
ing lines between the officers who had worked together in negotiating
Suharto’s resignation would define newly emerging military factions in the
post-Suharto era.
Launching First-Generation Reforms: The Habibie Interregnum,
1998–99
The interregnum of President B. J. Habibie, which lasted from May 1998
to October 1999, was an important juncture for the development of mili-
tary reform in the post-authoritarian polity. Important decisions were
made, but equally significant opportunities were missed. The new govern-
ment introduced radical changes to the political system, including fresh
general elections with multiparty participation, press freedom, and vastly
expanded civil liberties. Many of these reforms affected the armed forces in
a direct manner, challenging deeply entrenched military paradigms of
political corporatism and social control. Despite these cuts into tradition-
al areas of military hegemony, however, the Habibie administration made
wide-ranging concessions to the armed forces leadership under Wiranto.
The compromise reflected the ambivalent character of the regime change,
which had left influential elements of the New Order intact and allowed
the armed forces to continue exercising considerable political influence.
Designing Self-Reform: Wiranto and the “New Paradigm”
The relationship between the armed forces and B. J. Habibie was one of
mutual dependence. The new president relied on support from the armed
forces to stabilize his rule, fend off societal challenges to his legitimacy, and
prevent individual officers from undermining the reformist policies of his
administration. The armed forces, on the other hand, needed the good will
of the president, given his constitutional powers to appoint senior military
leaders, distribute resources, and set the political agenda. 
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This mutual dependence produced important policy compromises as
far as military reform was concerned. Most important, the military was
granted the right to formulate its own reform agenda. In return, however,
the armed forces had to pledge their sup-
port for Habibie and refrain from interfer-
ing with the process of political reform.
This trade-off was reflected in a number of
political events throughout the second half
of 1998. First, Habibie demanded in July
1998 that Wiranto assist in the election of
his candidate for the chairmanship of
Golkar, the former government party of
the New Order. Initially reluctant, Wiranto finally agreed to use his influ-
ence over the local Golkar boards to secure the victory of Akbar Tanjung,
Habibie’s nominee (Crouch 1999: 132). In November, the military was
asked to mobilize thousands of civilian demonstrators to back Habibie’s
plan to legalize his leadership in a special session of the MPR (Majelis
Permusyawaratan Rakyat, People’s Consultative Assembly).5 Against sig-
nificant opposition in the ranks, Wiranto decided once more to fulfill
Habibie’s request (Zen 2004: 95). Besides serving the president’s personal
interests, the military also reluctantly endorsed the sweeping changes to
the political framework. While warning that some reform measures were
going too far, the officer corps did not openly challenge the government’s
authority to implement them.
Given the concessions it had made to the civilian executive, the armed
forces leadership was determined to make extensive use of the authority to
select its own reform targets. Between July and November 1998, Wiranto
announced a number of internal reforms that produced relevant institu-
tional changes but protected the military’s primary source of power.
Wiranto proclaimed in July that the military was prepared to follow a
“New Paradigm.” This new concept, however, was in content and word-
ing identical with reform ideas formulated by progressive officers in 1996
and 1997 (Honna 2003: 164–65). Like the drafts circulating at that time,
Wiranto’s post-Suharto paradigm consisted of four points: (1) the military
was content not to be in the forefront of all national affairs; (2) the previ-
ous approach of occupying political positions was changed into influenc-
ing politics from a distance; (3) this influence was to be exerted indirectly
rather than directly; and (4) the armed forces acknowledged the necessity
the military was granted
the right to formulate its
own reform agenda
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of role-sharing with other national forces.6 The reuse of ideas developed in
the context of the late New Order to address the challenges of the postau-
thoritarian transition led some reformist officers to grumble in protest.
Agus Wirahadikusumah, for example, complained that “. . . the new para-
digm was not new at all. It was the same concept that we had written up
earlier in preparation for the time when Suharto would allow limited
reforms. Now he had fallen, with a big bang, and all we could come up
with was to take that old paper out of the drawer. Pretty saddening, actu-
ally. But hey, it was a start, they said.”7
Furthermore, the military gradually disposed of its Dual Function, the
doctrinal concept that had justified its concurrent involvement in security
and political affairs since the 1960s. The name of the concept was first
changed to “combined function” (peran terpadu) before being officially ter-
minated in 2000.8 This doctrinal change was accompanied by several meas-
ures designed to underline the military’s determination to extract itself
from active politics. In November 1998, a
new policy was implemented that no longer
allowed active officers to hold civilian posi-
tions in the bureaucracy. In addition, the
armed forces agreed to reduce their legisla-
tive representation to 38 delegates in nation-
al parliament (down from 75) and 10 per-
cent of the seats in local legislatures.
Wiranto also initiated the separation of the
police from the military, which had been united under the institutional
roof of Armed Forces headquarters since 1962. This split allowed Wiranto
to rename the military from ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik
Indonesia, Indonesian Armed Forces) to TNI, the term used for the armed
forces during the “glorious” days of the revolution. Finally, the armed
forces cut their formal ties with Golkar and pledged neutrality in the par-
liamentary elections scheduled for June 1999.9
Wiranto’s efforts marked the early phase of the first generation of civil-
military reforms. In this phase of the postauthoritarian transition, the insti-
tutions of the old regime are reviewed, disbanded, and replaced by new
bodies reflecting the changed political environment of the democratic poli-
ty. In Indonesia, the exclusion of active military personnel from govern-
ment and the gradual reduction of military representation in the legislature
were important steps in the formal depoliticization of the armed forces.
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They led to a widespread sense of uncertainty and concern within an offi-
cer corps that for decades had viewed high-profile bureaucratic careers as
part of its guaranteed professional benefits.10 However, successful comple-
tion of first-generation reforms is dependent on the accurate identification
and substantial restructuring of those power foundations that enable mil-
itaries to function as pillars of authoritarian rule. In the case of Indonesia,
the policy compromises between the armed forces and President Habibie
gave the former power to define the areas of reform and, by implication,
to exclude those fields that military leaders viewed as most crucial to their
interests. The character and scope of reforms proposed by the armed forces
thus not surprisingly suggested that the problem of military intervention
in politics was limited to the participation of senior officers in political
institutions. The solution, according to the armed forces, lay in simply
extracting the military from the political bodies it had penetrated; the
macrostructures of military organization, on the other hand, were not to
be affected. In the words of one senior officer, “the main target of our
reform program was to get out of politics, and that was met when we left
the government, disbanded our sociopolitical branches, and gradually
reduced our presence in the legislatures.”11 But this heavy emphasis on ter-
minating military engagement in civilian institutions distracted the atten-
tion of the public and political elite from other, more consequential areas
of reform.
Most important, the territorial command structure, the backbone of
military presence in sociopolitical life in the regions, was left untouched
for the entirety of Habibie’s interregnum. The territorial system consisted
of a vast network of command units
reaching from the capital down to the vil-
lage level.12 First practiced during the
guerilla war and institutionalized in the
mid-1950s, the territorial units exercised
social control and allowed the military to
access off-budget funding sources in the
regions. Through this system, the armed
forces have remained largely independent
from central government funding and
civilian control institutions. Maintaining the territorial power base and
the financial independence it generated was therefore one of the main
interests of the armed forces in the post-Suharto polity. Accordingly,
the territorial units…
allowed the military to
access off-budget funding
sources in the regions
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when the military leadership announced its plans for internal reform, the
territorial command structure was conspicuously absent. Its exclusion
from the reform agenda meant that a core element of first-generation
reforms was not tackled in the early period of the transition, which
obstructed other reforms from taking root and perpetuated the structures
upon which the military’s power had rested during decades of authoritar-
ian rule. 
Against this background, the institutional and doctrinal dismantling
of the Dual Function failed to address the fact that the political role of the
armed forces had been the result of, rather than the reason for, the
entrenchment of the military in Indonesia’s society. The military had been
granted direct participation in government in the late 1950s in acknowl-
edgement of its capacity to stabilize (or destabilize) civilian governments.
This capacity, in turn, was based on the military’s territorial presence,
autonomy from central funding sources, mediation in conflicts between
political parties, and other societal forces. The military reform measures
initiated under the Habibie government, on the other hand, scrapped the
Dual Function without addressing the causes that had produced it. Thus,
demands to prioritize the “revision of military doctrines that enshrined the
political role of the armed forces” (Ghoshal 2004: 521) were unlikely to
alter the underlying power structures that had produced these doctrines in
the first place.
In the same vein, the outpouring of societal criticism of the military’s
violent past cornered the armed forces and persuaded them to present a
reformed image, but did not cut to the core of TNI’s institutional interests.
In fact, many observers prematurely cited the trenchant public critiques of
the military as evidence that the powers of the armed forces had declined.
David Bourchier, for example, argued in 1999 that “ABRI’s public disgrac-
ing and the graphic exposure of systematic human rights violations in the
media seemed to signal a significant shift in the constellation of power”
(Bourchier 1999: 166). Such assessments, however, overlooked the
entrenched nature of the military’s power structures. Its deeply rooted soci-
etal networks enabled the military, in spite of continuing institutional
reform and sharp scrutiny of its history, to adjust effectively to the changed
political context of the postauthoritarian era. This adaptation was high-
lighted by the fact that some of the structural reforms initiated by the
Habibie government actually worked in the military’s favor. Most impor-
tant, the decentralization laws of 1999 prepared the scene for a substantial
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transfer of political authority and financial resources into the regions,
where the armed forces had a strong presence through their network of ter-
ritorial units. Decentralization thus offered the armed forces increased
opportunities to access the budgets of local governments at the district
level, where most of the new decentralization funds were concentrated.
With political parties struggling to establish a presence at the grassroots,
and legislatures and bureaucracies trying to cope with their new roles, the
military stood out as the only institution with a widely connected and
already tested infrastructure.13
Between the Past and the Present: TNI, the 1999 Elections, 
and East Timor
Growing intra-elite tensions surrounding the parliamentary and presiden-
tial elections in June and October 1999 accelerated the adaptation of the
military to the political system of the post-Suharto era. The impact of this
struggle for political hegemony was reflected in the changing relationship
between the armed forces and the president in the second half of Habibie’s
term. In the early period of his government, Habibie was able to rein in
the military elite by applying a combination of “persuasion” and compro-
mise. The electoral process, however, substantially weakened Habibie’s
position. His Golkar party only came in second in the parliamentary elec-
tions in June 1999, in which TNI had remained neutral both in rhetoric
and in practice. The party of Megawati Sukarnoputri, PDI-P (Partai
Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, Indonesian Democratic Party of
Struggle), finished first with 33.7 percent of the vote, turning Megawati
into the front-runner for the election of the president in October by the
MPR. Furthermore, a number of political and financial scandals crippled
the Habibie government throughout 1999, motivating even Golkar to
consider other presidential candidates. Deserted by large segments of civil
society and the political elite, Habibie increasingly resorted to the armed
forces as his last hope for a second term. In addition to TNI’s thirty-eight
seats in the MPR, enough to potentially swing the election in Habibie’s
favor, it possessed a vast network of informal relationships. Wiranto, how-
ever, was approached by other contenders as well, particularly by
Megawati, but also by Abdurrahman Wahid, who had the backing of a
coalition of Muslim parties. Only one year after the end of authoritarian
rule, the actors of the new democratic polity were lobbying the armed
forces for their political support.
The gradual intensification of intracivilian conflict throughout 1999,
and the way the armed forces benefited from it, signaled the rise of a new
dominant theme in post-Suharto civil-military relations. From early 1999
onward, disputes between Indonesia’s key civilian forces over political posi-
tions and the resources attached to them—not the policy compromises
characteristic of late-1998—became the main factor shaping the scope and
quality of reform. This phenomenon confirmed the Finerian notion that
the quality of civilian politics has a direct impact on the disposition of mil-
itaries to intervene in political affairs (Finer 2003: 86–89). In countries
with strong civilian parties and institutions which share a common under-
standing about military subordination to civilian rule, militaries find it dif-
ficult to interfere in the political process. States with weak political institu-
tions and high degrees of intracivilian conflict, on the other hand, are
much more likely to see military engagement in politics. In Indonesia, the
competition during the elections of 1999 pointed to vast opportunities for
the armed forces to use the increasing civilian fragmentation to their
advantage. In the parliamentary elections, for example, major parties
refrained from campaigning on a platform of military reform, fearing that
they might alienate senior generals whose support was needed in the fight
over the presidency. The conflicts of 1999 were only a prelude, however, to
a far more serious and wide-ranging confrontation between Indonesia’s
most influential civilian groups in the years to come.
The competition for the leadership of the first democratic govern-
ment since the late 1950s ended with Habibie’s defeat and the election of
Abdurrahman Wahid as Indonesia’s fourth president. Shortly before the
vote in the MPR, the military had shifted its support from the incumbent
to Wahid. Publicly declining Habibie’s offer to run as his vice-presiden-
tial candidate, Wiranto had entered into negotiations with Wahid
instead.14 The NU chairman, for his part, promised Wiranto that he
would play a prominent role in the new government, and even indicated
to the armed forces chief that he had a chance to become vice president.
Equally important, of course, were Wahid’s guarantees that the military’s
interests would be “protected” if he won the election.15 Convinced that it
had secured a fair political deal, the armed forces leadership finally
instructed its representatives to vote for Wahid, who subsequently beat
Megawati by a margin of 373 to 313.16 Wiranto’s hopes for the vice pres-
idency were dashed, however, when Wahid decided to support Megawati
for the post. The disappointed TNI leader was compensated with a key
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cabinet seat, and further ministerial positions went to Yudhoyono and
Agum Gumelar, another reform-minded officer who had supported
Wiranto during the competition with Prabowo.
The inclusion of prominent military figures in the post-Habibie gov-
ernment pointed to the political transformation of the armed forces in the
first eighteen months of the democratic system. From the main pillar of
Suharto’s regime, with the clearly defined and enforced agenda of prolong-
ing the rule of the incumbent, the armed forces had grown into an entity
with reduced institutional privileges, but expanded political flexibility,
internal autonomy, and informal influence on the outcome of inter-elite
competition. Wahid admitted as much before his victory: “You still can’t
become President in Indonesia without the military. They’re out of the
bureaucracy, and all of that, but that’s nonsense. Nonsense! They’re still
strong, and Wiranto will support me to become President.”17
Wahid’s analysis reflected pride in his ability to use military support in
outplaying his civilian opponents and assuming power, but it would also
turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy affecting his own term in office. The
events of the following two years would
demonstrate that in addition to obtain-
ing military support to gain the presi-
dency, it was equally essential for the
incumbent to maintain that support if
he wanted to stay in power. The deep
involvement of the military in the
struggle for political power exposed the
fragmentary character of the first-gen-
eration reforms initiated during
Habibie’s interregnum. The continued
entanglement of the armed forces in
the competition among civilian leaders and the persistence of the territo-
rial command system were important indicators for the slow progress in
the civil-military transition. Moreover, Richard Gunther (2001: 151) has
pointed to another crucial deficiency in military reform, arguing that the
TNI’s continued representation in parliament, albeit reduced, endowed
“the military with ‘reserve powers’ that might be invoked to frustrate a
democratic mandate.” 
However, the most striking evidence for the success of the armed
forces in avoiding subordination to civilian control was its independent
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political operation in East Timor, where the government and the United
Nations held a referendum to determine the future status of the territory
occupied by Indonesia since 1975.
Despite its formal support for the referen-
dum, the military openly mobilized mili-
tias to terrorize proponents of East
Timor’s independence and intimidate
voters into endorsing the special autono-
my package offered by Indonesia
(Kammen 2001; Greenlees and Garran
2002). When the East Timorese voted for
independence nevertheless in September
1999, disgruntled army units and the militias supported by them went on
a rampage, killing at least 1,300 people.
The devastation of East Timor was a consistent extension of the “cul-
ture of violence” that Geoffrey Robinson (2002: 273–74) described as an
inherent feature of TNI’s thinking and operational behavior. The carnage
also suggested that the reforms implemented since 1998 had led to only
superficial change in the way the armed forces conducted their security
operations. Despite its formal repositioning as an apolitical defense force,
it appeared that the military, or at least influential elements within it, had
decided to circumvent the civilian government’s instructions, engineer a
vote that was in its institutional interests, and lay waste to East Timor
when that goal was not achieved. As a result, Indonesia suffered a major
international embarrassment when it had planned to score a diplomatic
victory, and President Habibie, who was widely believed to have eyed the
Nobel Peace Prize, was voted out of office one month after Australia and
the United Nations moved into East Timor.18
The events in East Timor not only highlighted the ineffectiveness of the
first generation of military reforms. They also served as a painful reminder
to the officer corps that in an environment of increased public scrutiny,
conventional intelligence operations had ceased to be effective tools for
intervening in political affairs (Robinson 2001: 254). The military’s adap-
tation to postauthoritarian politics had rested on its ability to use the new
democratic polity for its purposes; the operation in East Timor, in contrast,
was driven by the false assumption that the referendum could be won with
traditional New Order instruments of intimidation and political manipula-
tion. In many ways, the failure to orchestrate the East Timor ballot in
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Indonesia’s favor marked the end of a transitional period that had seen
many New Order practices simply extending into the democratic polity.
The East Timor debacle and the election of Abdurrahman Wahid as
Habibie’s successor in October 1999, it seemed, symbolized the beginning
of a new phase in postauthoritarian politics in which these practices were
no longer applied in their traditional forms, but needed to be assimilated
to the norms and rules of democratic competition.
Radical Reform, Radical Failure: The Wahid Presidency, 1999–2001
The legacy of the Wahid presidency for military reform in Indonesia can
hardly be overestimated. This is true for both the reformist policies it pur-
sued and the serious consequences its failures incurred. The Wahid govern-
ment launched the most courageous mil-
itary reform project in many decades,
only to witness its collapse triggering
stagnation and regress. The Wahid years
provide the key to understanding the
consolidation of military self-confidence
after 2001, the renaissance of ideological
conservatism throughout the ruling elite,
and the emergence of retired generals as
top political contenders in the post-
Wahid era.
Wahid’s Radical Reform Initiative
On paper, the ascension of Abdurrahman Wahid to the presidency offered
improved prospects for accelerated civil-military reforms. To begin with,
the establishment of the first democratically elected executive since 1955
removed large segments of the former New Order elite from government.
Moreover, the participation of most political parties in the cabinet
appeared to provide the very “unity of democratic purpose among civilian
elites” that Diamond and Plattner view as a precondition for successful
military reform in democratic transitions. The armed forces had also just
suffered a humiliating defeat in East Timor, leading to increased external
pressure on Indonesia to reform its military structures. Finally, the new
president also seemed to have the necessary political credentials to speed
up military reform. Abdurrahman Wahid was widely viewed as a demo-
cratic reformer, despite his controversial role in late New Order politics.
Kammen and Chandra (2002: 103) noted that Wahid’s “strong Islamic
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credentials, political savvy, and wit were expected to tame the military
beast.” The new president took office with a sound understanding of the
depth of military intervention in Indonesian politics, and he immediately
began to dismantle the network on which it was based. Starting with his
personal surroundings, he sought to marginalize armed forces officers in
the palace bureaucracy.19 His secretary, Ratih Hardjono, for example, spent
much of her first working days removing military tapping devices from the
presidential residence and office.20
In the first months of his administration, Wahid “took a series of meas-
ures to exert civilian control over the military and rein in the Army”
(Editors 2000: 126). He appointed Admiral Widodo, a navy officer, as
TNI commander, drawing from the service that, according to Eric
Heginbotham (2002: 121–22), was “significantly more sympathetic to lib-
eral political and economic positions” than the land forces. Compensating
key army officers like Wiranto, Yudhoyono, and Gumelar with cabinet
posts, Wahid removed them from command positions and elegantly ended
their military careers. He also appointed a widely respected civilian aca-
demic as minister of defense (the first since the early 1950s), disbanded a
military-coordinated security agency notorious for its political surveillance
activities, and abolished the socio-political offices at the Ministry of the
Interior, a traditional military stronghold. Wahid, it appeared, was deter-
mined to initiate a radical process of military reform and enforce civilian
supremacy over the political realm.
The replacement of several army generals who had risen to promi-
nence under Suharto’s rule aimed at the very break with the New Order
military that Habibie had not achieved. Wahid had identified Wiranto as
the major obstacle to further military reform and consequently moved to
destroy the latter’s patronage network spread throughout the TNI hierar-
chy. In this context, he asked his personal confidant, Matori Abdul Djalil,
the chairman of the NU-affiliated PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa,
National Awakening Party), to come up with a list of military officers who
could be expected to take the lead in revamping TNI’s institutional struc-
tures.21 Topping the list was Agus Wirahadikusumah, who had been a
member of the small circle of military reformers during the final years of
Suharto’s rule. He was dissatisfied with Wiranto’s slow pace of internal
reform, exposing the fissures within the group of relatively moderate mili-
tary officers that had negotiated Suharto’s resignation and had subsequent-
ly assumed leadership of the post-1998 military. Shortly before joining the
20 Marcus Mietzner
The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia 21
cabinet as coordinating minister for political and security affairs in
October 1999, Wiranto had sent Wirahadikusumah off to Makassar as
regional commander of Sulawesi Island.22 However, Wahid quickly decid-
ed to bring him back to Jakarta and groom him as the future commander
of the armed forces.23 In order to catalyze this paradigmatic change in the
military leadership, Wahid forced Wiranto to resign from the cabinet in
February 2000, citing the result of an official inquiry into the violence in
East Timor, which had implicated Wiranto. Shortly afterward, the presi-
dent arranged the appointment of Wirahadikusumah to head Kostrad,
replacing close Wiranto associate Lt. Gen. Djadja Suparman. 
The most important indication of Wahid’s seriousness in pushing the
reform of the armed forces was his encouragement of debates on the
future of the territorial command structure. This command system, with
its fund-raising capacities and opportunities for political intervention,
was at the core of TNI’s institutional interests. The territorial units had
been excluded from TNI’s reform agenda in
1998, and except for the nominal abolition of
their political intelligence units, had survived
the postauthoritarian transition almost
unchanged. Defense Minister Juwono
Sudarsono (2000) estimated that “over 70 per-
cent of our defense spending are accrued from
off-budget sources” at the national and local lev-
els. Despite increased competition after 1998
from the police and a league of paramilitaries,
which also sought economic engagements to raise their funds (Kristiansen
and Trijono 2005: 237), the army’s local units remained primary con-
tenders for protection contracts with entrepreneurs and their often ques-
tionable operations. 
Consequently, the vast majority of officers wanted to maintain the
territorial concept and the benefits attached to it, with only a small num-
ber recommending its reform (Aribowo: 117). It was Agus
Wirahadikusumah’s trenchant criticism of the system—most eloquently
presented at a parliamentary hearing in December 1999—that had
caught Wahid’s attention and made him the president’s choice to lead the
military into a new phase of reforms. In Wirahadikusumah’s view, the
lower levels of the command structure were leftovers of the authoritarian
past and therefore completely disposable: “Why do we need a territorial
[Wahid encouraged]
debates on the future
of the territorial
command structure
b
unit in Wonosobo? Will the enemy attack us there? No, we have those
units because lazy, inflexible officers have become complacent playing pol-
itics, making money, and retire on a nice civilian post out there. That has
nothing to do with defense.”24
The speed with which TNI headquarters adopted the reform rhetoric
appeared to confirm Wahid’s strategy of rapid and extensive change. In
April 2000, a TNI leadership meeting endorsed Wirahadikusumah’s pro-
posal for a pilot project aimed at the partial disbandment of the two low-
est levels of the command system in selected urban areas. The project was
designed as a starting point for a much larger effort, namely the gradual
dismantling of the territorial structure from the Korem level downwards.25
Wirahadikusumah had already begun in February to cooperate with sever-
al universities and think tanks on the development of such plans, and the
official TNI endorsement seemed to clear the way for the most substantial
reform of the armed forces since the late 1950s. Wahid’s biographer Greg
Barton (2002: 384) concluded, rather prematurely, that the president had
“tamed” the military, calling it one of his “greatest successes.”
Military Factionalism under Wahid
The unprecedented depth and scope of the reform effort triggered the most
extensive fragmentation of the military elite since May 1998. The armed
forces leadership around Wiranto had been relatively homogeneous during
Habibie’s interregnum, but the increased pressure for military reform
brought the paradigmatic differences within the officer corps into the
open. The disagreements among generals previously loyal to Wiranto,
which in the past had been papered over by their joint opposition towards
Prabowo, now gave rise to distinct and antagonistic factions. Agus
Wirahadikusumah, who according to Bourchier and Hadiz (2003: 280)
was “in favor of much more sweeping reforms than his commanding offi-
cers were prepared to countenance,” led the faction of rapid reformers. The
goal of this group was to accelerate the assimilation of military structures
and norms to the conditions of the new democratic polity. To achieve this,
Wirahadikusumah aimed to interact with politicians and state institutions,
create a favorable public image in the media, and develop ties with civil
society groups:
This is a new era. In the past, an officer had to suck up to Suharto to get
promoted and have influence. Now it is much more complicated. You
have to play your cards right. The politicians must like you, the media
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must like you, only then you’re a winner. They call me the multimedia
officer. Let them do that, I don’t care.26
Chandra and Kammen (2002: 114) noted that the faction led by
Wirahadikusumah consisted almost exclusively of members of the military
academy class that graduated in 1973. They maintained that the large size
of the 1973 class and its entanglement in an unsupportive promotion pat-
tern had significantly reduced the career prospects of its members. The
reformist attitude of 1973 officers was, in this view, a logical attempt to
break the monopolization of top positions by the 1970 and 1971 classes.
This explanation is questionable for a number of reasons. First, the
reformist attitudes of Wirahadikusumah and some of his associates could
be traced back at least to the 1980s, well before the reshuffle cycles of 2000
became apparent. Second, many rapid reformers in the 1973 class, includ-
ing Wirahadikusumah, were on track for promotions to senior positions
when the split within the ranks occurred. Third, some prominent gradu-
ates of 1973 did not belong to the group of rapid reformers, like
Yudhoyono and Ryamizard Ryacudu, who were members of different fac-
tions. Fourth, Chandra and Kammen’s excessive emphasis on the techni-
cal aspects of promotion patterns ignores the political and personal atti-
tudes of senior officers that reflect individual family backgrounds, socioe-
conomic conditions and intellectual development. It appears that the lat-
ter combination of factors played a much larger role in determining con-
ceptual positions than the inconclusive reference to reshuffle patterns.
The rapid reformers defined their agenda largely to counter that of
their major rivals, the conservative officers opposed to wide-ranging mili-
tary reforms. Compromised mostly of army generals with strong personal
ties to Wiranto, the dominant view within this faction was that the
reforms undertaken since 1998 had been sufficient, and in some cases even
excessive. Many officers in this camp believed that Suharto’s removal had
been inevitable, and that the military had to make adjustments if it want-
ed to survive under the new democratic regime.27 But they were also deter-
mined to ensure that the core institutional interest of the armed forces,
namely their organizational autonomy from interference by civilian gov-
ernments, would not be undermined by ongoing and future reforms.
Under Wahid, this faction felt a deep sense of marginalization as its main
patron, General Wiranto, was removed from both the military leadership
and cabinet. With Wiranto loyalists gradually replaced by more reform-
minded officers, the conservative generals not only saw their agenda threat-
ened, but also began to fear for their individual careers. The group accused
the rapid reformers of sacrificing TNI’s interests in order to promote their
personal objectives, and were fiercely opposed to Wirahadikusumah’s push
for accelerated change in the armed forces. After Wiranto’s dismissal,
Djadja Suparman emerged as the informal leader of the conservative fac-
tion. He had not only lost his Kostrad command to Wirahadikusumah,
but was also the target of corruption charges initiated and publicized by his
successor. Suparman felt that his reputation and career had been destroyed,
and he held Wirahadikusumah personally responsible for this.28
In an additional twist that pointed to the shifting interests in the con-
servative camp, many of its officers began to build relationships with the
very militant Muslim groups they had previously opposed in their compe-
tition with Prabowo. Wiranto, for example, who had warned against the
mobilization of pro-regime Islamist militias in the final phase of Suharto’s
rule, discovered the usefulness of radical Muslim organizations while
organizing crowds in defense of the Habibie government in the second half
of 1998. From then on, Wiranto cultivated personal ties with many lead-
ers of Muslim groups at the fringes of the political spectrum.
Consequently, when Indonesia’s human rights commission in 2000 ques-
tioned Wiranto over his role in East Timor, the militant FPI (Front
Pembela Islam, Front of the Defenders of Islam) was one of the few socie-
tal groups to stage demonstrations in his support. In the same vein, Djadja
Suparman, seen as a solidly “secular” general prior to Suharto’s fall, was
now widely believed to have close contacts with FPI and other Muslim
militias, including some that were engaged in conflicts with Christian
groups in the Moluccan Islands.
Chandra and Kammen (2002: 141) asserted that the opponents of
accelerated reform originated largely from the 1970 and 1971 classes
which had occupied the majority of command posts in the period leading
up to Wahid’s ascension to power. Their rejection of reform, Chandra and
Kammen argue, was a tool to prevent the 1973 class from further rising
through the ranks. Once more, this argument has several loopholes. Agus
Widjojo, for instance, was a 1970 graduate and a leading gradual reformer
(see below). Furthermore, Widjojo’s classmate, Army Chief of Staff Tyasno
Sudarto, initially supported Wirahadikusumah’s calls for reform in the
hope that this might improve his political standing. These examples show
that opposition to reform was not an inevitable choice for the 1970 and
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1971 classes, but that their members possessed (and exercised) a wide vari-
ety of options. Similarly, some of the most vocal members of the anti-
reform group were graduates from the classes of 1972 and 1973, like
Suparman, Bibit Waluyo, and Ryacudu. Opposition to reform, therefore,
appeared to have been rooted in specific circumstances rather than attach-
ment to a certain class.
The resentment of Wirahadikusumah and his reform proposals
aligned Suparman and his associates with the third faction in the armed
forces, the gradual reformers. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had previously
been the leading gradual reformer, but after he joined the cabinet, the
most prominent officer in this group was
the new chief of staff of territorial affairs,
Agus Widjojo. Widjojo and
Wirahadikusumah had been close associ-
ates in the 1980s and most of the 1990s,
but their relationship had disintegrated
with the latter’s rapid ascent under Wahid.
Widjojo believed that reform had to pro-
ceed at a faster pace than envisaged by
Wiranto but not as rapidly and less radi-
cally than that pushed by
Wirahadikusumah. In the short term,
however, he viewed Wirahadikusumah’s populism as a more immediate
threat to the coherence and dignity of the armed forces.29 Widjojo and his
office refused to cooperate with the army’s pilot project to disband seg-
ments of the territorial command structure and began to develop counter-
proposals instead. Widjojo was not, however, “vehemently opposed to the
liquidation” of territorial units, as some observers assumed (Sumarkidjo
2001: 143). His plan envisioned that territorial tasks previously carried
out by the armed forces be handed over to provincial administrations
within a timeframe of up to twenty years, accompanied by the gradual dis-
mantling of the lower levels of the command structure (Mietzner 2003).
This gradual approach, Widjojo argued, would allow for institutional
adjustments and avoid uncertainty within the officer corps over possibly
negative consequences for individual careers.
The intensity of intramilitary conflict in the early Wahid period indi-
cated that the president’s initiative to reform the armed forces was taken
very seriously by its opponents and supporters within the ranks. The
Widjojo refused to
cooperate with
the…project to disband
segments of the territorial
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opponents of further military reform, for their part, began to realize that
they could no longer negotiate compromises with the executive in order to
protect the main elements of the military’s power base. Wahid, it appeared,
targeted nothing less than the fundamentals of TNI’s political and eco-
nomic influence, and he seemed to have the necessary political will and
backing to succeed. In the same vein, the rather small faction of rapid
reformers was sufficiently convinced of the government’s seriousness that it
took the risk of isolation from the military mainstream by siding with
Wahid and carrying out his reform orders. 
Thus the extreme levels of factionalism reflected the belief within the
officer corps that, for the first time since the 1950s, the civilian elite was
strong enough to push through wide-ranging reforms of the military
against the explicit wishes of the armed forces leadership. This phenome-
non, in turn, highlighted the relevance of Finer’s observations on the link
between the state of civilian politics and the extent of military interven-
tion in political affairs. In the early phase of Wahid’s rule, the prospect of
a solid civilian coalition insisting on the acceleration of military reform
shocked conservative officers and encouraged the reformers, creating dis-
unity in the ranks and weakening the armed forces as a single political
actor. For a while, it even appeared as if the military was paralyzed in the
face of united civilian leadership. This paralysis did not last long, howev-
er. Once again proving Finer right, the military (or more precisely, the
opponents of further reform within it) soon recovered its strength amid
escalating intracivilian conflicts and the subsequent disintegration of
Wahid’s government.
Subversion or Disintegration? The “Sudden Death” of Reform
Despite favorable political conditions at the beginning of his term, Wahid
saw his military reform initiatives faltering before they had reached the
stage of actual implementation. Many of the rapid reformers lost their
positions only months after their appointments, and the reform projects
they had intended to launch never materialized. Two divergent sets of
propositions have been put forward for this abrupt termination of radical
reform. Damien Kingsbury (2003), on the one hand, argues that the
armed forces sabotaged Wahid’s reform projects, working behind the
scenes to orchestrate his downfall. Authors like Jun Honna (2003: 184), on
the other hand, focus more on the political blunders of the president that
put him “in a position in which he was forced to make concessions to
ensure the loyalty of the military, or at least to avert a show of defiance.” 
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There is no doubt that the mainstream of the armed forces opposed
the radical reform measures introduced early in Wahid’s rule, and that it
used every opportunity to halt and overturn them. Kiki Syahnakri, then
deputy army chief of staff, admitted that the military rejected Wahid’s
“tendency and attitude to break into technical military areas,” violating
“mechanisms and strict procedures” (Syahnakri 2003). It was the president
himself, however, who created the political context in which such opposi-
tion proved effective. Malik Haramain (2004: 339) points to the “conflict
between the President and Parliament that provided TNI with the oppor-
tunity and self-confidence to show open opposition and insubordination
to the President.” From virtually the first week in office, Wahid began to
dismantle the civilian support network that had voted him into office.
Between November 1999 and May 2000, he fired several ministers from
PDI-P, Golkar, and the Islamic PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan,
United Development Party), appointing personal loyalists in their stead.
In addition, Wahid intervened in legal proceedings and in the internal
affairs of state enterprises, apparently in order to promote the political and
economic interests of his major financial patrons. Moreover, he appeared
increasingly erratic, threatening to arrest his political adversaries and pro-
ducing headlines with controversial statements and policies on an almost
daily basis. Gradually excluded from power and disillusioned with the
president’s leadership, the parties that had secured Wahid’s election began
to unite against him (Mietzner 2001). In his study on the “perils of presi-
dentialism,” Fukuyama (2005: 109) concluded that once Wahid’s “poor
decisions cut him off from the kind of major-party support that he need-
ed in Indonesia’s quasi-parliamentary system, the drop was very steep and
he was effectively finished.”
The erosion of Wahid’s civilian support base removed one of the
major preconditions for the successful implementation of radical military
reform. The further the alienation between the president and key political
parties and organizations progressed, the more conservative elements in
the military elite felt encouraged to oppose structural reform of the armed
forces. In the lead-up to the annual session of the MPR in August 2000,
during which Wahid had to account for his first ten months in office, the
president gave in to the demand of the TNI leadership to sideline Agus
Wirahadikusumah and abort the reform initiatives he had initiated.
Wahid’s move was designed to secure political backing from the armed
forces mainstream, compensating for the dramatic loss of support from
civilian groups in and outside the legislature. Shortly before the session
commenced, Wirahadikusumah was relieved of his Kostrad command and
assigned to a desk job at TNI headquarters. This was followed by Wahid’s
announcement to the Assembly that he would delegate responsibility for
internal TNI affairs to his deputy, Megawati Sukarnoputri, who had been
in contact with conservative elements in the top brass for some time, large-
ly in order to express frustration over her own isolation from government
business (Said 2001: 351). She had joined forces with senior officers in
June in demanding the dismissal of Bondan Gunawan, Wahid’s state sec-
retary and a close civilian ally of Wirahadikusumah.30 The fact that
Megawati was handed increased authority over TNI was thus greeted with
great satisfaction in conservative military circles. Evidently, the opponents
of accelerated reform in the armed forces had successfully used the conflict
between the presidency and the legislature to pursue their interests, and the
initially rapid pace of military reform came to an almost complete stand-
still as a result.
The political events surrounding the MPR session of 2000 suggest that
it was the president’s rapid loss of civilian support, rather than subversion
by the armed forces, that caused the sudden stagnation in military reform.
Although some observers have stated that Wahid had no other choice than
to compromise with opposition officers in the military, his presidential cri-
sis was largely self-inflicted. William Case (2002: 73), for example, asserts
that Wahid needed “to avoid antago-
nizing the hard-liners” in the armed
forces “if Indonesia’s new democracy
was to persist.” It is almost certain,
however, that sufficient backing in
the legislature would have allowed
Wahid to isolate conservative officers
effectively and continue with the rapid reform of TNI. The armed forces
were only in a position to oppose presidential authority when political cir-
cumstances allowed them to do so (Lee 2000: 706). In February and
March 2000, when the scope of Wahid’s political decline was still unclear,
the armed forces leadership felt institutionally obliged to comply with his
instructions. Only several months later, after the implications of the presi-
dent’s isolation from the political elite were fully evident, did the military
elite grab the opportunity to launch effective attacks on his reform policies. 
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The Threat of Emergency Rule and Wahid’s Fall
Isolated from the political elite and powerless to rein in the armed forces,
Wahid resorted to increasingly irrational threats against his opponents.
When Parliament issued a memorandum in February 2001 to initiate a
process aimed at his impeachment, the president threatened to “freeze” the
legislature, declare a state of emergency, and use the security forces to exe-
cute his orders. Army Chief of Staff General
Endriartono Sutarto, however, indicated
that the military would not carry out such
instructions (Malley 2002: 132).
Unintentionally, Wahid had provided the
armed forces with the unique opportunity
of portraying themselves as having complet-
ed the self-transformation from Suharto’s
repressive tool to a democratically aware and
responsible defense force. TNI leaders main-
tained that their opposition to the emer-
gency decrees proved their “consistency in
implementing TNI’s New Paradigm (. . .),
its neutrality and non-involvement in practical and partisan politics and
its refusal to be used as an instrument of power” (Markas Besar TNI
2001c: 57). Military opposition toward Wahid, previously widely
described as defiance vis-à-vis civilian supremacy, now gained recognition
as an act protecting democratically legitimized institutions of the state.
Wahid’s associates were puzzled that the public began to see Wahid no
longer as a reformer but as a “dictator.”31 In more conceptual terms, Dan
Slater (2004: 68) suggested that “Wahid dove ever deeper into delegative
democracy’s bag of tricks,” referring to O’Donnell’s notion of a system in
which democratically elected leaders use authoritarian methods to stay in
power (O’Donnell 1994).
The military’s description of its own role in the Wahid polity echoed
similar themes that had circulated in the political chaos of the 1940s and
1950s. Back then, high levels of political conflict among the civilian elite
had allowed the armed forces to depict themselves as an apolitical institu-
tion above partisan interests, a mediator between divided parties and a
defender of national interests. Under Wahid, these traditional elements of
the military’s self-perception not only were resurrected, but were expand-
ed to include the protection of democratic values. In addition, TNI saw its
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usual notions of civilian incompetence and adventurism confirmed, pro-
viding it with welcome arguments to establish normative limits to civilian
control over the military. 
While much of this internal military discourse reflected necessarily
biased self-appraisals, many Indonesians came to a similar view. Opinion
polls showed a dramatic increase in the approval ratings of the military,32
and both the president and his opponents were lobbying the armed forces
to side with them in their struggle for political hegemony. This fact was at
odds with the proposition developed by Rabasa and Haseman (2002: xiv)
that it was the military that suffered most from conflicts within the civil-
ian elite. For TNI, intracivilian fragmentation offered the potential for
gaining wide-ranging political concessions from various sides. In the words
of one Australian observer, the military warmed up to the idea “that the
longer the turmoil continues, the more Indonesians may come to see it as
the last hope for stability” (Dibb 2001: 839).
Wahid’s attempt to use the security forces in his fight with the oppo-
sition not only damaged his reputation as a democratic reformer, but also
catalyzed the impeachment proceedings against him. In May 2001, the
national parliament, DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat), issued a second
memorandum against the president, fulfilling the formal conditions for a
special session of the MPR to decide on Wahid’s dismissal should the lat-
ter not respond satisfactorily to Parliament. Subsequently, the president
stepped up his preparations for the declaration of a state of emergency
and the dissolution of the legislature. Faced with an unsympathetic mili-
tary mainstream, however, Wahid turned to the police for support. In
June, he tried to install Chaeruddin Ismail as chief of police, replacing
Gen. Bimantoro, who was known to be close to Megawati. According to
an MPR decree passed in 2000, the president had to seek the approval of
Parliament before appointing or dismissing a TNI commander or chief of
police; Wahid therefore opted to “suspend” Bimantoro and appoint
Ismail as deputy chief with full executive powers. Bimantoro refused to
leave office, however, and the constitutional conflict between the presi-
dential office and Parliament over the issue further aggravated political
tensions. When Wahid threatened to bring thousands of fanatical sup-
porters from his stronghold in East Java into Jakarta to defend him
(Feillard 2002), the president lost his last ally: Megawati. On July 18, she
met with leading figures of the opposition and declared that a special ses-
sion of the MPR was “unavoidable.” Cornered by his vice president,
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Wahid named Ismail chief of police and asked his staff to draft a decree
for the declaration of a state of emergency. As an open violation of exist-
ing constitutional requirements, Ismail’s appointment provided the DPR
with the legal trigger to convene a special session of the MPR. The
Assembly began on July 21 to hear the impeachment charges, and there
was little doubt that it would dismiss Wahid and install his deputy to
serve out the remainder of his term.
The president’s last chance for political survival rested with individual
officers in the security forces who might have been willing to carry out his
orders. Ismail was one such officer, but he was effectively sidelined by
Bimantoro and was never endorsed by the vast majority of the police top
brass. On the military side, Wahid offered the post of TNI commander to
Lt. Gen. Johny Lumintang. Lumintang’s frequent visits to the palace
caused speculation within the ranks that he was considering the offer, but
he ultimately refused. The other officer who was mistakenly seen as siding
with Wahid was Lt. Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu, the commander of Kostrad.
On July 22, his troops paraded in front of the palace, leading the president
to believe that he had won an important military ally. Consequently,
Wahid associates made the rounds to other senior military officers, aiming
to convince them that the political constellation was shifting in their favor.
They even visited one of Wahid’s most trenchant military critics, Djadja
Suparman, who in turn contacted Ryacudu and confirmed that the
rumours about him were baseless.33 Ryacudu’s clarification exposed the
president’s isolation from the security forces that were formally under his
command. By violating clearly defined regulations, Wahid offered the
police and the armed forces strong arguments to defy his instructions and
ignore his authority. As Liddle (2003) put it, “the generals rejected Gus
Dur’s last-ditch attempt to save himself by staging a Sukarno-style coup
against the MPR.” On July 23, the military and police faction in the MPR
voted with most of the other parties to oust Wahid from office and
appoint Megawati as his successor. 
The fall of Wahid brought one of the most chaotic periods of
Indonesia’s postauthoritarian transition to an end. Launched with promis-
es of sweeping political change, Wahid’s presidency collapsed under mas-
sive conflicts within the elite and ultimately left mixed legacies for demo-
cratic consolidation and civil-military relations. On the one hand, Wahid
was responsible for some of the most innovative policy initiatives ever pre-
sented by an Indonesian executive, including offers of fresh negotiations
with the separatist movements in Aceh and Papua and wide-ranging
reform of the armed forces. On the other hand, the president instituted
authoritarian patterns of political interaction and promoted economic
favoritism that channeled resources to his closest associates and constituen-
cies. This ambivalence remained even in the highly charged atmosphere of
his final months in office: while he tried to use the armed forces against his
opponents, and offered political concessions to them in the process, small
steps toward the institutional reform of the military continued. There were
two main initiatives in this regard. First, the
MPR passed two decrees in 2000 that
defined the task of the military as being
focused exclusively on defense, while inter-
nal security was to be handled by the police.
The same decrees also finalized the depar-
ture dates of TNI personnel from
Parliament for 2004 and from the MPR for
2009 “at the latest.”34 Second, Wahid
encouraged intensive civil society participation in the drafting of a new
State Defense Bill, designed to replace the web of New Order laws that had
legitimized the military’s political role (Tim Propatria 2004). Such levels of
civil society engagement in deliberating defense legislation are typically
found in postauthoritarian states that have already begun the second gen-
eration of civil-military reforms. That it was achieved in Wahid’s Indonesia
provided, in the words of his second minister of defense, Mahfud MD, “a
glimpse of what could have been if (Wahid) had not created such a mess.”35
Both in its courageous reform drive and its dramatic failure, the
Wahid presidency exposed two major realities of civil-military relations in
Indonesia’s postauthoritarian transition. First, the political influence of the
armed forces rose and fell proportionately to the level of conflict within
the civilian elite. Backed by a large coalition of political parties, Wahid was
able to launch an ambitious military reform program at the beginning of
his term. As the alliance fell apart, so did the prospect of substantially
reforming the armed forces. Rizal Sukma and Edi Prasetyono (2002: 25)
concluded that it was this “protracted tension and competition among
civilian political forces and elites” that compromised the “bargaining posi-
tion of the civilians” vis-à-vis TNI. Another study on Wahid’s rule con-
curred that “although there was a formal commitment to ending military
engagement in politics, the requirements of real politics forced civilian
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politicians to be pragmatic and seek support from TNI (. . .) to confront
their political opponents” (Anwar 2002: 213). Second, the central role of
the military in the struggle over Wahid’s presidency revealed the limita-
tions of the first generation of military reforms. The TNI leadership was
able to exert significant political influence despite the ongoing institu-
tional depoliticization of the armed forces, indicating that their powers
rested more on their traditional security function than on the number of
cabinet or parliamentary seats that they held. For the military elite, this
circumstance provided evidence that its interests were perfectly compati-
ble with the structures and dynamics of the democratic polity. No govern-
ment could afford to alienate the armed forces, and opposition groups
regularly approached military leaders to pull them over to their side.
Whatever the outcome of political conflicts, the armed forces were certain
to profit from them.
TNI Consolidates: The Megawati Presidency, 2001–04
Many observers have singled out the Megawati presidency as the period in
which military reform stagnated and eventually regressed. While this is
historically accurate, the lackluster leadership of Megawati, whom Sidney
Jones once called “sort of a mascot” of the armed forces,36 was not the only
factor to blame. Inheriting a state torn by
a year-long constitutional crisis, Megawati
not only had to deal with a significantly
strengthened military, but also was con-
fronted with several domestic and interna-
tional trends that were hardly of her mak-
ing (Qodari 2005: 85). The rising threat
of international terrorism, which in 2002
finally reached Indonesia, handed the
armed forces additional rationale to delay
further reform of its command structure.
In addition, the renaissance of nationalist-
unitarian notions of state security, which Megawati certainly endorsed,
was not only a government-driven initiative, but had taken hold of
Parliament, the media, and society as a whole. In short, the stagnation in
military reform was much more a product of general societal processes
than the critics of Megawati’s political apathy were ready to admit.
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Concessions and Nationalist-Unitarian Renaissance
Among the most important factors behind the changing civil-military rela-
tionship in the post-Wahid period were the concessions that Megawati
granted to TNI in order to anticipate possible challenges to her rule. In
extending more privileges to the armed forces, she continued and acceler-
ated a trend started under the previous government. Wahid had been giv-
ing concessions to the military elite since mid-2000—terminating the
reform of the territorial command structure, removing controversial offi-
cers, reversing his liberal positions on separatism, and allowing security
crackdowns in Aceh and Papua. Megawati, anxious to secure military sup-
port in case the political elite deserted her, expanded these concessions to
include greater institutional autonomy and increased influence on security
affairs. In a wide-ranging reshuffling of the top brass in 2002, the post of
TNI commander was returned to the army and taken over by Sutarto, an
open-minded yet determined defender of the military’s interests. 
Megawati also supported the promotion of Ryamizard Ryacudu to the
position of army chief of staff. Ryacudu was known for his conservative
ideological views and his opposition to further military reform, making
him politically controversial but popular with the army mainstream. As
minister of defense, Megawati appointed Matori Abdul Djalil, who had
just lost the chairmanship of PKB over his involvement in Wahid’s
impeachment and was therefore without any significant political support
base. Deprived of his patronage network and lacking knowledge of the
conceptual and technical aspects of military affairs, Matori sought to com-
pensate by driving a course of accommodation toward the military elite.37
In August 2003, after two ineffective years as minister, Matori suffered a
stroke, and Megawati did not fill the position before the expiration of her
term in October 2004. Megawati’s disengagement from details of military
management, combined with the vacancy in the Department of Defense,
left the military largely in control of its internal affairs throughout
Megawati’s rule.
The fact that Megawati felt it necessary to grant concessions to the
military pointed to continued splits within the civilian elite. Apparently,
Megawati was deeply distrustful of the political leaders who had facilitat-
ed Wahid’s downfall and her ascent to the presidency. Although she had
received assurances from senior politicians that she would be allowed to
serve out her term, Megawati found it wise to keep the military on board
should that pledge be dishonored. Many of the party leaders who prom-
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ised not to challenge her rule until new elections in 2004 had experi-
enced difficult relations with Megawati in the past, often reaching back
to the 1980s and 1990s. Her relationship with modernist Muslim leader
Amien Rais was particularly problematic. A university professor who had
often made fun of Megawati’s intellectual mediocrity, Amien Rais had
been the key operator behind moves to deny her the presidency in 1999,
and had worked toward Wahid’s dismissal only months after brokering
his election. This distrust between key civilian leaders, aggravated by the
constitutional crisis of 2001, convinced politicians to maintain good
relations with the military, particularly after assuming executive office. A
kind of life insurance against desertion by political allies and attacks by
long-time opponents, concessions to the military became an integral part
of post-Suharto civilian politics, with negative implications for the
process of military reform.   
Megawati’s strategic concessions to the armed forces coincided with
significant shifts in the ideological and political disposition of large seg-
ments of the civilian elite from the second half of 2001 onward.
Megawati’s political conservatism, her preoccupation with the territorial
integrity of the state, and her indifference to intellectual discussions on
human rights and individual freedoms certainly played a role in this
development, but was far from being the only factor driving it. Instead,
the remarkable renaissance of nationalist-conservative sentiments reflect-
ed broader social trends in Indonesia’s political and economic life. By
2001, the initial enthusiasm for political change and liberalization had
largely subsided, with politicians and ordinary people alike openly ques-
tioning the effectiveness of post-Suharto reforms. In the economic realm,
many Indonesians felt that post-New Order governments had failed to
rebuild the economy, which had collapsed dramatically in 1998 and had
caused a significant decline in general living standards. This disappoint-
ment gave rise to calls for a review of the general style of governance,
echoing the widespread view that “anarchy” among the new political
institutions had replaced the meticulous economic planning of the
Suharto government. Opinion surveys conducted at that time showed a
steady decline in the trust put into the quality of civilian government and
a sharp increase in the number of Indonesians believing that their lives
were better under the New Order.38 This general disillusionment in the
population boosted the confidence of politicians who had harbored deep
suspicions towards the reforms implemented after 1998, but had never-
theless joined in the popular pro-reform chorus of that time in order to
promote their postauthoritarian careers. The changed political climate
after 2001, however, allowed them to dispose of their reform vocabulary
and replace it with demands for a government more concerned with pol-
icy outputs than upholding democratic procedures.
The turn against reformist ideals and policy experiments also spread
into the arena of security and military affairs. There were three main devel-
opments that triggered counter-reflexes toward radical plans for reforming
the security sector. First, the loss of East Timor was largely blamed on the
allegedly permissive attitude of the Habibie government toward what the
New Order regime would have classified as enemies of the state.
Consequently, key policymakers convinced themselves that tougher poli-
cies were needed to discourage other territories from seeking separation as
well. The events in East Timor also had instilled a sense in many politicians
that foreign powers had an interest in Indonesia’s particularization, and
that part of their “grand design” was weakening the armed forces. In
response to this perception, the positive attitude toward military reform
within the political elite began to dissipate. Second, the outbreak of com-
munal violence across the archipelago between 1999 and 2001 nurtured
concerns that further reforms in the security sector could undermine the
ability of the police and the armed forces to deal with the unrest. The eth-
nic conflicts in Central Kalimantan, as well as the religious clashes in
Maluku, North Maluku, and Central Sulawesi claimed thousands of lives
and dominated the headlines in the national press throughout the Wahid
period. The longevity of the conflicts led to calls for a strict security
approach toward those involved in the fighting, which the military claimed
was only possible if its authority and resources were increased. Third, the
expansion of separatist movements in Aceh and Papua during Wahid’s rule
had ultimately overstretched the patience of the Jakarta-based elite in both
the executive and the legislature.  As Richard Chauvel and Ikrar Nusa
Bhakti (2004: 52) formulated, the elite adopted a “nationalist mindset”
that increasingly opposed accommodative, compromise-seeking policies
towards separatist groups. Leading politicians viewed the “soft” approach
applied by the Habibie and Wahid governments as a massive blunder, and
were eager to address the problems militarily.
The renewed prioritization of territorial integrity and repressive
methods of conflict resolution favored the armed forces in several ways.
It restored the military’s claim to a domestic security role and returned the
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armed forces to the center of policymaking in areas affected by separatist
movements and sectarian clashes (Crouch 2003a: 20). Most notably, in
May 2002 the government decided to transfer authority for security
operations in Maluku from the police to the military. This reorganization
ended a long and unhelpful quarrel between the two institutions over
who should lead the effort to return stability to the violence-torn region.
Djoko Santoso, the local military commander at that time, used his
increased powers extensively. Widely seen as tough but professional, he
succeeded in reducing the levels of militancy among the conflicting par-
ties, including within his own ranks. (His success in Maluku paved the
way for Santoso to become army chief of staff in 2005, and he is tapped
to take over as TNI commander in 2008.) In addition to its high-profile
engagement in Maluku, the military also expanded its role in Central
Sulawesi, rolled back concessions made to Papuan separatists under
Wahid’s rule, and re-established restrictions on political life in Aceh,
where hundreds of thousands had openly demonstrated for independ-
ence in August 2000. For much of Indonesia’s elite, and even some for-
eign observers, these relaunched military operations had proven the con-
tinued indispensability of TNI in upholding law and order, despite the
increased political repression attached to them. Donald Weatherbee
(2002: 28), for example, agreed with the rationale that “nationwide
domestic disorder raise(s) the question of whether there is an appropri-
ate domestic security role for TNI.”
The change in civilian elite attitudes also confirmed and legitimized
TNI’s new emphasis on the concept of “NKRI” (Negara Kesatuan
Republik Indonesia, Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia) as its
main ideological guideline. Under the New Order, TNI had referred to the
state ideology Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, and the Dual Function
when justifying its intervention in politics and domestic security affairs.
After Suharto’s resignation, however, TNI began to gradually replace these
paradigms with frequent warnings of Indonesia’s territorial break-up,
blaming uncontrolled democratization and alleged foreign conspiracies.
Pointing to the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia after the
fall of communism, TNI argued that only its territorial presence in the
regions was able to prevent Indonesia from going down a similar path.
Initially an internal military theme, which had its roots in the Habibie
period, the concept of NKRI expanded rapidly into the civilian realm after
Wahid’s unsuccessful attempts at “appeasing” separatist movements in
Aceh and Papua. By late 2001, it had become a standard element of polit-
ical language, widely used by politicians, journalists, and even critical non-
governmental organizations. Epitomizing the post-reformasi fears of polit-
ical instability and social disintegration, the proud notion of NKRI
appeared to return some of the national self-confidence lost in the chaos of
the transition. Conveniently for the armed forces, these fears within the
civilian elite, as well as the defiant responses to them, served TNI’s inter-
ests in defining and defending its role in post-Suharto politics. 
Fearing that further experiments would reduce the capacity of the
armed forces to crack down effectively on separatist rebels or sectarian mil-
itants, many politicians suspended
their demands to reform the territo-
rial command structure and other
important aspects of military organ-
ization. As one member of
Commission I on Defense and
Security in Parliament explained:
“Now is not the time to experiment
with military reform. Now is the
time to support our military in their
fight against separatists, in their
fight to safeguard the territorial
integrity of Indonesia. (…) I’m sure there will be a time to resume reform
in the future.”39
In fact, the majority of the civilian elite appeared even more inclined
to resort to traditional military paradigms of violent conflict resolution
than President Megawati herself. Throughout 2002 and early 2003,
Megawati allowed her coordinating minister for political and security
affairs, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, to seek a peaceful settlement of the
Aceh problem through negotiations mediated by the Geneva-based Henry
Dunant Centre (HDC) (Huber 2004). The efforts resulted in a “cessation
of hostilities agreement” in December 2002, but most civilian politicians
and the armed forces were unwilling to endorse it. The military was wide-
ly suspected of sabotaging the peace deal by engineering attacks on moni-
tors of the cease-fire, and in May 2003 the agreement collapsed.
Unanimously supported by Parliament and the vast majority of the public,
Megawati declared martial law and launched one of the largest military
campaigns in Indonesian history.40
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The military operation in Aceh provided important insights into the
state of civil-military relations in Indonesia five years into the post-
Suharto transition. The civilian government left the definition of the
strategic goals of the campaign and their implementation largely to the
armed forces, and with no effective minister of defense since August
2003, executive oversight of the operations was scant. Parliament limited
its control function to infrequent meetings with TNI leaders and granted
most of the financial requests made by the armed forces without demand-
ing detailed explanations for particular budget items.41 Senior officials in
the State Auditing Board frequently reminded Parliament not to grant
new funds before TNI had accounted for previous budget allocations, but
to no avail.42 The deficient oversight mechanisms not only pointed to
continued capacity problems within the civilian defense establishment,
but also highlighted a new political climate in which critical comments
on military operations were rarely heard. 
Given that executive and legislative control of the military operations
was weak, societal oversight became particularly important. The pool of
nongovernmental “watch dogs” was limited, however, to a few critical
organizations. Many Acehnese activists opposed to the military offensive
left the province in fear of arrest or other forms of retribution, making it
difficult for Jakarta-based NGOs to gather information from the combat
areas. Moreover, media coverage was largely restricted to quoting official
military sources, with journalists “discouraged” from interviewing sepa-
ratist rebels. It was thus impossible for civilian control authorities and the
public to verify military data related to the campaign, including the num-
ber and classification of victims.43
At the local level, the military established an emergency administra-
tion that quickly accused the civilian bureaucracy of corruption and inep-
titude. In addition, vacant civilian posts in local government were filled
with army officers imported from
TNI’s vast territorial network, allowing
the armed forces to illustrate the con-
tinued importance of their command
system. In short, the campaign in Aceh
exposed the inherent weaknesses of the
institutional control framework set up
during the first generation of military
reforms, and revealed how distant
the campaign in Aceh
exposed the inherent
weakness of the institutional
control framework
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Indonesia was from entering the second generation of change aimed at
creating workable systems of democratic control. 
TNI and the War on Terror
The concessions to the armed forces after the constitutional crisis of 2001
and the renaissance of militaristic paradigms of conflict resolution provid-
ed two important factors for the political consolidation of the armed
forces under the Megawati presidency. The changed international and
domestic security environment after September 11 supplied a third crucial
element. Since the 1990s, Indonesia’s armed forces had been isolated by
the United States and most of its Western allies for failure to address seri-
ous human rights violations committed by TNI officers, particularly in
East Timor. Congress had prohibited the U.S. government from establish-
ing full military-to-military ties with Indonesia, requiring that TNI first
meet certain reform benchmarks. The officer corps had responded to this
pressure with open defiance. Expressing its indifference toward the poten-
tial benefits of foreign military aid, the
TNI leadership continued to put officers
implicated in the East Timor carnage
into strategic positions. However, some
generals felt disturbed by the stigma on
TNI’s international reputation. Prior to
September 11, senior officers had asked
the U.S. embassy in Jakarta to assist in
their efforts to lift existing restrictions by
issuing a statement acknowledging the
success of military reforms implemented
so far.44 Their request had been turned
down, but the attacks on New York and Washington changed the strate-
gic priorities of the United States completely. Its focus was now on the cre-
ation of a global network of effective counterterrorism forces to gather
intelligence and carry out arrests, replacing what Catharin Dalpino (2002:
93) called the “free-floating post-Cold War idealism” behind “American
support for Indonesia’s democratization process.” Anthony Smith (2003a
and 2003b) argued that it was this new interest in establishing countert-
errorism cooperation with Indonesia’s military that provided “the main
impetus to find a way to partially restore military-to-military ties.” Thus
after September 11, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and
Secretary of State Colin Powell rushed to certify that TNI had achieved
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satisfactory levels of success in its reform process, expecting that Congress
would subsequently lift restrictions.45 The role of international pressure in
promoting military reform, which had always been rather marginal in
Indonesia, was now reduced to an absolute minimum.
The Indonesian armed forces quickly grasped that the political fallout
of the global war on terror carried, in Donald Emmerson’s words (2002:
122), “more opportunity than danger.” Senior officers instinctively under-
stood that the United States and its allies needed strategic partners in their
fight against terrorist networks, and that this new geopolitical constella-
tion was likely to end TNI’s international isolation. The increased focus on
counterterrorism was not only an international phenomenon, however.
The Bali bombings in October
2002, which killed more than 200
people and delivered negative head-
lines for Indonesia around the
world, lifted the war against terror
from an issue of largely diplomatic
significance to an urgent political
priority for Megawati’s government.
The Indonesian authorities reacted
with a major crackdown on domes-
tic terrorist networks, passed new
antiterrorism laws, and supported
harsh and at times extra-judicial measures against suspects.46 Again, the
armed forces soon took advantage of the new situation. Army Chief of
Staff Ryamizard Ryacudu suggested that in response to the terrorist crisis,
the government should “revive” and expand the intelligence gathering
capabilities of the territorial commands.47 His proposal was well received.
Following the bombing of the Australian embassy in Jakarta in September
2004, Megawati decided to include the military in counterterrorism units
previously made up exclusively of police officers.48 Despite this concession,
the police kept its central role in counterterrorism efforts—much to the
displeasure of TNI officers, who continued to argue for a more extensive
engagement of the armed forces.
TNI’s Electoral Politics: Consolidating the Gains
The increased strategic value of the armed forces, boosted by their media-
tion in intracivilian conflict, their dominance in fighting separatist move-
ments, and their new role in the war against terror, translated into politi-
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cal capital for the officer corps. Rita Smith Kipp (2004: 68) commented
that at the very least, it “allowed the military to resist overhauling the ter-
ritorial command structure.” That was not the only benefit, however.
Internally, the armed forces were now in a position to dispense with much
of the reform rhetoric adopted since 1998. Opponents of accelerated
reform, representing the army mainstream, moved to marginalize the
group of gradual reformers under Agus Widjojo from the center of deci-
sion-making. Throughout 2001, the chief of staff of territorial affairs had
developed his ideas on reforming the territorial command structure into a
detailed policy paper (Markas Besar TNI 2001a and 2001b). Circulating
widely in September 2001, the paper led to open protest by officers who
wanted to maintain the territorial system. In November 2001, Widjojo’s
office was disbanded, and he was shifted to the less significant post of
deputy chairman of the MPR. His removal marked the end of the internal
military discourse on revamping the territorial command system and left
the armed forces without influential proponents of reform. 
Externally, the consolidation of the armed forces was mirrored in their
increased popularity within the civilian elite and among the wider public.
Polls showed that many Indonesians now favored a president with a mili-
tary background, reversing the trend of the early postauthoritarian peri-
od.49 In practice, the improved image of the armed forces led to gains for
the military in the two most disputed political arenas of the Megawati poli-
ty: the struggle for executive positions in the regions and the preparations
for the 2004 elections. 
The election of new governors throughout Indonesia in 2002 and
2003 exposed the success of the armed forces in preserving their political
power. In 1999, new bills on regional parliaments had been passed, allow-
ing the legislatures to elect governors and district heads without interfer-
ence by the central government. This was widely expected to discontinue
the traditional grip of the armed forces on key governorships in Java and
other crucial provinces. At that time, Michael Malley (2003: 111) noted
that “the full impact of decentralisation is likely to be realized over the
course of 2003 as the terms of governors appointed during the waning
days of the Soeharto regime finally expire.” The conflict between political
parties over these crucial positions was so intense, however, that many of
them decided to back the incumbent or nominate other retired military
officers to replace them (Honna 2005). Jakarta’s governor, Lt. Gen. (ret.)
Sutiyoso, who had first come to office in the final days of the New Order,
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was re-elected in 2002—this time with the assistance of PDI-P. Lt. Gen.
(ret.) Mardiyanto, governor of Central Java, won a second term in 2003,
defeating another retired military officer backed by Amien Rais and his
party, PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional, National Mandate Party). Lt. Gen.
(ret.) Imam Utomo of East Java also was re-elected in 2003, beating a for-
mer general supported by PKB patron Abdurrahman Wahid.50 In West
Java, a retired officer lost against a Golkar bureaucrat who happened to be
a central figure in FKPPI (Forum Komunikasi Putra-Putri Purnawirawan
Indonesia, Communication Forum of Sons and Daughters of Indonesian
Veterans).51 In Maluku, a former regional commander was elected as the
new governor of the conflict-ridden province. The brother of Gen.
Ryamizard Ryacudu became vice governor in the highly contested guber-
natorial elections of Lampung, and retired generals defended their gover-
norships in East Kalimantan and North Sumatra. Explaining this phe-
nomenon, Crouch (2003b) argued that political elites probably calculat-
ed that “it is better to re-endorse a military officer . . . than to risk the
election of governors from rival parties.”
The successes of retired officers in regional elections prepared the
scene for the substantial engagement of former military leaders in the
national polls of 2004. The presidential nominations of several New
Order military figures, which resulted in what one observer called an
Indonesian version of “star wars” (Editors 2005), demonstrated once
again how the armed forces as an institution as well as their individual
protagonists were able to use the new democratic conditions to their
advantage. In August 2002, the MPR passed the last of a series of consti-
tutional amendments that paved the way for direct presidential elections
and removed the military from the Assembly. 
TNI headquarters initially opposed the abolition of the electoral pow-
ers of the MPR, which in the past had allowed the armed forces to partic-
ipate in backroom deals that decided the composition of the national lead-
ership. It quickly became clear, however, that the new electoral mechanism
did not necessarily disadvantage the armed forces and their personnel, as
senior retired officers began to position themselves to run for the presiden-
cy. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, for instance, supported the foundation of
the Democratic Party in September 2002, which was widely seen as the
unofficial launch of his presidential campaign. Wiranto and Prabowo
competed for the nomination of the Golkar Party, while Amien Rais
approached several officers to become his vice presidential candidate,
among them Sutarto.52 Hamzah Haz, chairman of PPP, recruited Agum
Gumelar as his running mate. While retired military officers largely pur-
sued their individual ambitions and thus did not directly represent the
institutional interests of the armed forces, they were unlikely to substan-
tially hurt the organization that had propelled them into national promi-
nence. As one Indonesian commentator put it, “it has always been debat-
ed whether a retired military or police officer is considered a civilian or mil-
itary man.” But, he concluded, “it is difficult to believe that a retired mil-
itary or police officer has no emotional links or organizational loyalty to
their previous institutions” (Razak 2004). In addition, the courting of
active military leaders by civilian politicians suggested that any elected
president, whether former military or civilian, would seek the support of
the armed forces and protect their fundamental interests in return.
The inclination of political parties to support or recruit military candi-
dates in order to outplay civilian rivals underscored once again one of the
major themes in post-Suharto civil-military relations: the crucial role of
intracivilian fragmentation in determining the extent of military participa-
tion in political affairs. In many cases, the support for the candidacies of
military nominees by civilian leaders appeared irrational, and was only
explicable by extreme personal and political rivalries between societal lead-
ers. Among the many examples of such antagonisms, Abdurrahman
Wahid’s support for General Wiranto seemed particularly odd. Wahid had
dismissed Wiranto as minister in early 2000, citing the latter’s poor human
rights record. In 2004, however, Wahid had other concerns. His protégé-
turned-rival within Nahdlatul Ulama, Hasyim Muzadi, had accepted the
nomination as Megawati’s running-mate—against Wahid’s declared wishes
and instructions. Outraged at Muzadi’s move, and declared unfit to contest
the elections himself, Wahid threw his support behind Wiranto, who
endorsed Wahid’s brother Solahuddin as his vice presidential candidate.
Apparently, Wahid’s dislike of Muzadi was much stronger than his reserva-
tions about a potential Wiranto presidency, which many domestic and
international observers described as deeply worrisome. In interviews with
foreign journalists, Wahid expressed his conviction that Wiranto had no
chance of winning, suggesting that his strategic priority had been to under-
mine the Megawati-Muzadi ticket. Whatever Wahid’s real motivations
were, his actions provide a classic example of how conflict among civilian
leaders, in this case even from the same organization, has the potential to
expand the political space of active and retired military officers.
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In addition to severe intracivilian fractures, the campaign for the 2004
presidential elections also highlighted the decline of the societal resent-
ment of military engagement in politics that had been a prominent feature
of the early phase of the postauthoritarian transition. Student groups and
critical civil society organizations
demonstrated against retired military
officers participating in the elections,
but unlike in 1998, their protest did not
reflect general trends and sentiments in
the larger population. Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono, who in 2001 had conclud-
ed that “Indonesians are not ready yet
for a former general to become their
leader,” emerged as the front-runner in
the presidential race.53 He eliminated
Wiranto, Amien Rais, and Hamzah in the first round of elections in July
2004 and set up a showdown with Megawati in September. Megawati,
trailing her opponent by an average of 30 percentage points in opinion
polls, tried to tap into a largely eroded antimilitary sentiment by allowing
her campaign team to refer to Yudhoyono as “General Yudhoyono.”54
Presented by her supporters as a civilian candidate fighting against
resurgent military powers, Megawati appeared at odds not only with her
previous image as a political “mascot” of the armed forces, but also with
the indifference of the electorate toward the civilian-military dichotomy.
Megawati had simply lost much of the trust that voters had put in her in
1999, having established a reputation for being aloof, inactive, intellectu-
ally and technically incapable, and out of touch with the concerns of a
socially and economically troubled populace (Liddle and Mujani 2005:
123). The issue of civilian control of the armed forces was of negligible
importance for most voters, who sought improvement in the political and
economic conditions of their daily lives. Consequently, Yudhoyono
trounced Megawati in the second round of the elections with a margin of
60.6 to 39.4 percent, completing the successful adaptation of military
leaders to the post-Suharto polity. The trauma of the New Order, while
still generating sufficient societal support for the democratic system,
began to fade amid more immediate priorities of political stability and
economic recovery. 
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Interlude: Yudhoyono and Post-Suharto Military Politics
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s military and political career under three
post-Suharto governments and his rise to the presidency reflect structural
developments in Indonesian military politics since Suharto’s fall. They mir-
ror the gradual and sophisticated adaptation of the armed forces to the new
political framework, ranging from the disorientation of the early phase of
the postauthoritarian transition to the successful use of democratic compe-
tition for the benefit of the military and its individual officers. A short
analysis of Yudhoyono’s career after 1998 can therefore help to illustrate the
major arguments outlined above.
In the late New Order, Yudhoyono had managed to build a reformist
image in the officer corps and the political elite without drawing Suharto’s
anger. Earlier than Wiranto, he had feared serious consequences for the
armed forces if Suharto continued to deny political reforms or sought to
stay in office indefinitely. He played a significant role in convincing the
military leadership under Wiranto that it had to let go of Suharto if it
wanted to play a role in post-New Order politics, and he negotiated with
civilian leaders over the terms of the president’s resignation. Yudhoyono’s
progressive attitude in the final months of the New Order could not hide
the fact, however, that he too was ill-prepared for the almost complete lib-
eralization of the political system introduced by the Habibie government.
Despite his rejection of the excesses of authoritarianism, he shared many of
the traditional military sentiments against democratic practices and rules.
In the early Habibie period, he recommended limitations on the number
of political parties and proposed regulations restricting their religious-ide-
ological orientation.55 His suggestions were ignored by the government,
however, leading to considerable confusion in the officer corps and
increased pressure on the armed forces to conform more quickly to the
conditions of the democratic polity.
The circumstances of Yudhoyono’s appointment to the first Wahid
cabinet in October 1999 exposed the uncertainties and inconsistencies of
TNI’s transitional process. Yudhoyono initially rejected the post of minis-
ter of energy and mining and expressed his preference to remain in active
military service. Only after Wahid insisted did he accept his nomination.
With societal resentment of military officers in politics still high, the
prospects of a retired general in civilian-dominated democratic politics
were rather unpredictable. In contrast, the continuation of his military
service would have almost certainly led him to the top post in the army
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and subsequently the armed forces. Yudhoyono has often spoken in bit-
terness about his aborted military career, and his actions after the appoint-
ment provide evidence for his inner confusion (Hisyam 2004). Although
he himself had drafted the regulation that military officers had to retire
when taking up civilian posts, Yudhoyono now postponed his own retire-
ment for almost a year. Instinctively sensing the instability of the Wahid
government, Yudhoyono apparently tried to keep the door open for a pos-
sible return to active service. He also resisted Wahid’s courtship to become
a leading figure in his party, PKB.56 It was only in August 2000 that
Yudhoyono began to warm to the idea of a political career without finish-
ing the military path he felt destined for. The political climate was chang-
ing, societal objections toward military figures in civilian posts were wan-
ing, and Wahid offered him a post in which he gained nominal supervi-
sion of Indonesia’s security forces. Yudhoyono’s appointment as coordi-
nating minister for political, social, and security affairs marked his ulti-
mate entry into civilian elite politics, including the risks and complica-
tions associated with it.
In his new post, Yudhoyono was drawn into the intense elite negotia-
tions surrounding the conflict between Wahid and the legislature. Like the
armed forces as an institution, Yudhoyono went through an extremely
unstable period of political infighting but finally managed to emerge as
one of its beneficiaries. The chaos of the Wahid presidency eroded the pos-
itive public image of civilian politics and led to a surge in the popularity
of the armed forces and retired officers in political positions. Wahid’s dis-
missal of Yudhoyono in June 2001 only helped to cement the impression
of failed civilian leadership and allowed the former general to portray him-
self as a victim of degenerate elite politics. Thus the fierce conflict between
key civilian figures not only boosted the poll ratings for Yudhoyono and
engagement of military leaders in politics, but it also delivered a welcome
theme for his further political career. The critique of elite-oriented and
unaccountable party leaders developed into Yudhoyono’s leitmotif as he
planned his political future. It also helped him to explain and digest his
failed candidacy for the vacant position of vice president after Megawati’s
ascent to power in July 2001:
[Yudhoyono] accepted his defeat without complaint. He even learnt a
lesson from Senayan [the legislature]. The political process in the MPR
sometimes does not mirror the reality outside of the MPR building.
[Yudhoyono] who was favoured by a number of polls could not win the
competition in the building of the people’s representatives. That was a
lesson he did not have to regret. It was precisely this defeat that bolstered
his understanding of the games in the Assembly. (. . .) Party leaders still
determined the voice of the party. That was legitimate, but not an ideal
democracy (Hisyam 2004: 451).
The experiences collected during the Wahid period encouraged
Yudhoyono to take the final step in his adaptation to postauthoritarian pol-
itics. Formerly a supporter of indirect and regulated mechanisms of dem-
ocratic competition, he now believed that only a strong public mandate
could break the deadlock within the political elite. Yudhoyono, and later
the armed forces as a whole, therefore gave up their opposition to direct
presidential elections. After the MPR determined in August 2002 that the
next president would be elected directly by the people, Yudhoyono and
other retired officers began to prepare their candidacies.
Despite the new focus on direct elections, elite politics remained an
important instrument for Yudhoyono to build support networks for the
upcoming campaign. Thus he accepted his reappointment to the cabinet
by Megawati, which allowed him to maintain his presence in the media
and elite negotiations. In fact, his cabinet seat
was of such importance to Yudhoyono’s cam-
paign preparations that for a long time he
refused to confirm his candidacy publicly. He
even denied that he was behind the forma-
tion of the Democratic Party in September
2002, even though his wife was acting as
deputy chairperson. The continued use of
government facilities on the one hand and
the quiet build-up of his electoral campaign
on the other put Yudhoyono into open con-
frontation with Megawati, who stood for
reelection herself. She began to isolate
Yudhoyono from government business, delivering him the opportunity to
stage a publicity-rich resignation from cabinet in February 2004. The pub-
lic perception that Yudhoyono had once again fallen victim to brutal elite
politicking contributed to the unexpected success of the Democratic Party
in parliamentary polls in April.57 The party’s 7 percent showing took it
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above the threshold required to make a presidential nomination, increas-
ing Yudhoyono’s self-confidence and giving him greater leverage over the
selection of his advisory team: he included a large number of retired mili-
tary officers whom he trusted completely and who had developed an
understanding of his political thinking in years of joint service. After his
victory, Yudhoyono appointed several of them to key government posts.
Together, they had lived through the ups and downs of the military’s tran-
sition from a pillar of authoritarian rule to a mediator and participant in
democratic politics. After six-and-a-half difficult years, one from their
ranks had gained the presidency, swept to power by the very democratic
reforms introduced to end military dominance over the political system.
Taming the Conservatives: The Yudhoyono Government
Although he had been the leader of the gradual military reformers during
his service in the armed forces, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was not
expected to initiate wide-ranging changes to the security sector when
assuming the presidency in October 2004. During the electoral campaign,
Yudhoyono had indicated that he saw no urgency in reforming the army’s
territorial command structure or changing the way the military interacted
with civilian control institutions like the Department of Defense.
Consequently, during his first year in office he put much more stress on
strengthening his personal control over the defense establishment than on
pushing for structural reforms. This approach produced dramatic success-
es in some areas, but led to structural stagnation in others. On the one
hand, Yudhoyono succeeded in sidelining the most conservative officers
from the army leadership. Their marginalization secured, in turn, the mil-
itary’s compliance with the government’s peace plan for Aceh. In terms of
institutional military reform, however, many of the initiatives launched by
the Yudhoyono government have been slow and fragmentary.
Removing the Spoilers: The Helsinki Peace Accord
The most consequential decision on military affairs under the Yudhoyono
government so far has been the removal of General Ryamizard Ryacudu
from the armed forces elite. As the most vocal representative of the anti-
reform wing in the armed forces, Ryacudu frequently spoke out on issues
ranging from civilian deficiencies in governance to the threat of national
disintegration (Liddle and Mujani 2005: 124). As army chief of staff, he
was not only a visible symbol for the military’s reluctance to further
reform, but he also had the power to influence the outcome of important
policy processes. In early 2003, Ryacudu had belonged to the fiercest
opponents of the Aceh peace process, and many believed that he played a
major role in its failure. In the final days of her rule, Megawati chose
Ryacudu to replace Endriartono Sutarto as TNI commander, claiming
that the latter had submitted his resignation to her (which Sutarto
denied). Parliament withheld the necessary confirmation of the presiden-
tial nominee, however, allowing Yudhoyono to overturn the appointment
when taking office. In fact, Yudhoyono not only withdrew Ryacudu’s
nomination, but replaced him in February 2005 as army chief of staff with
Djoko Santoso, a much less controversial figure. After leaving him with-
out a portfolio for more than a year, Yudhoyono effectively terminated
Ryacudu’s military career in January 2006 by nominating Air Force Chief
of Staff Djoko Suyanto to replace Sutarto. Even before Ryacudu’s fall,
however, some of his conservative allies had been sent into retirement.
Their replacements were career officers who neither had great interest in
reform nor showed particular inclination to undermine it. The marginal-
ization of the most controversial officers sent a clear warning to the mili-
tary that despite his own reluctance to rush through concrete reforms, the
president was prepared to sack even high-ranking generals if they threat-
ened to damage his political agenda and reputation.
Nowhere was Ryacudu’s absence more perceptible than in Aceh, where
the government brokered a peace deal with the separatist movement GAM
(Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, Free Aceh Movement) in August 2005. In the
accord, GAM promised to drop its demand for independence in exchange
for the withdrawal of significant numbers of TNI troops and the establish-
ment of an Acehnese system of “self-government.” Given that the previous
“cessation of hostilities” agreement had collapsed only two years earlier,
most observers predicted that spoilers in the military ranks would again try
to bring down the accord. The first phase of the peace process, however,
passed by without any major disturbances. TNI leaders expressed undivid-
ed optimism over the prospects of the agreement and even praised GAM
for surrendering its weapons according to the established procedures. 
The contrast could not have been starker to March 2003, when
Ryacudu had fuelled discontent with the HDC-led peace initiative by
expressing sympathy for militia attacks on peace monitors.58 This time
around, TNI field commanders posed for photo sessions with former
GAM rebels, and were quick to pledge their loyalty to the government’s
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peace plans.59 Beside the exclusion of the most influential spoilers from the
field, the Yudhoyono government also understood that it had to compen-
sate TNI for its potential loss of income in Aceh’s lucrative conflict econ-
omy (McCulloch 2003). Accordingly, it allocated 526 billion Rupiah
(around 50 million U.S. dollars) for TNI to finance its partial withdrawal
from the province––a sum very similar to what TNI would have received
if the war had continued.60 The payment was a major disincentive for sen-
ior officers to prolong the war, convincing them that the peace deal was
not only politically viable, but also economically advantageous for them.
Yudhoyono’s success in enforcing military compliance in Aceh marked
a watershed in post-Suharto civil-military relations. For the first time, the
government was able to secure the military’s support for a negotiated set-
tlement with separatist rebels. In 1999,
the armed forces had openly under-
mined the attempts of the Habibie
administration to solve the East Timor
question through a referendum, leading
to massive violence and TNI’s interna-
tional isolation. In Papua, the military
in 2000 and 2001 had defied President
Wahid’s orders to refrain from physical
repression of separatists, exploiting
inconsistencies in the government’s
approach to launch a major crackdown
on the rebels and their sympathizers. In 2003, the armed forces actively
worked toward terminating the peace accord with GAM signed in Geneva
in late 2002, using the failure of the separatist movement to fully comply
with the agreement as a welcome opportunity to push for a full-scale mil-
itary operation in Aceh. 
That the military decided to adhere to the 2005 settlement had less
to do with the devastating tsunami that had hit Aceh in December 2004
than with the specific approach and institutional authority of the
Yudhoyono government. On the one hand, Vice President Kalla had bro-
kered the peace deal based on an economic, even entrepreneurial, inter-
pretation of the existing conflict patterns. He understood that in order to
make the agreement work, both GAM and TNI had to receive econom-
ic incentives. The compensation offered to TNI in the form of “with-
drawal funds” significantly reduced the military’s opposition toward the
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accord. On the other hand, military officers realized that Yudhoyono was
now in a position to dismiss officers who were seen as undermining the
government’s policies in Aceh. Back in 2003, when Yudhoyono had driv-
en the peace process as coordinating minister for political and security
affairs, he had lacked the necessary authority to effectively sanction offi-
cers opposing the peace process. As president, Yudhoyono possessed this
authority, and the officer corps felt that he was determined to use it.
Edward Aspinall (2006: 56) reiterated this point by emphasizing that “it
would be no easy task even for the TNI to sabotage the peace agreement,
if the agreement retained the active backing of the most important polit-
ical figures in the land.”
The support of the armed forces for the Aceh peace process, which
followed their widely praised cooperation with international militaries
during the tsunami relief operations several months earlier, led Western
governments to reevaluate their relationship with TNI. After September
11, 2001, there had been increased interaction between the U.S. military
and its Indonesian counterpart in the context of counterterrorism training
and intelligence exchange (Chow 2005: 312), but Congress had upheld
major restrictions on defense relations with TNI. In November 2005,
however, Congress allowed the Bush administration to waive the condi-
tions the former had established for the resumption of full military-to-
military ties. While the U.S. government cited national security interests
as the reason behind this decision, it would have been unthinkable to lift
the restrictions had TNI played an obstructive role in the Aceh peace
process. Thus the novelty of firm military obedience to government direc-
tives on settling a separatist conflict peacefully facilitated not only the sur-
prisingly smooth implementation of the Helsinki accord, but also TNI’s
international rehabilitation.
Juwono Sudarsono’s Quest for Authority
Removing the extreme hardliners from the ranks proved a successful gam-
ble for Yudhoyono, but institutionalizing further military reform was a
completely different matter. The political and economic framework in
which TNI operated still allowed it to exercise a high degree of institution-
al autonomy. The Habibie and Megawati governments had largely ignored
the issues of military self-financing and structural subordination to civilian
control, while the Wahid administration had failed spectacularly to push
through radical reforms. Yudhoyono thus tried to relaunch initiatives for
institutional change, and Juwono Sudarsono’s appointment to his second
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stint as minister of defense was designed to signal the president’s determi-
nation in this area. Sudarsono was one of the few Indonesian politicians
who recognized the severe consequences of TNI’s self-funding mecha-
nisms for the quality of civilian democratic control of the military. He was,
however, also deeply sympathetic to the difficulties and shortcomings of
military officers and soldiers in the field, defending them against frequent
public criticism, which he believed was based on highly unrealistic expec-
tations regarding Indonesia’s under-funded military. In addition to his bal-
anced views, Sudarsono had also experienced first hand the problem of
trying to establish ministerial control over unwilling and self-confident
generals. During his first term as minister in 1999 and 2000, he had been
involved in frequent disputes with military officers over his authority to
issue directives to the armed forces. Accordingly, Sudarsono had two major
priorities when taking office again in October 2004: (1) to draft new leg-
islation that would firmly subordinate the armed forces to the Department
of Defense; and (2) to begin the process of reforming the military’s financ-
ing system by establishing better controls over its economic enterprises
(Editors 2005).
Sudarsono’s attempts to enforce his authority over the armed forces
faced immediate opposition from the military elite. TNI Commander
Sutarto greeted the new minister, who according to the State Defense Act
of 2002 was in charge of defense planning, with a reminder not to “talk
about issues related to the armed forces.”61 The cool reception set the
tone for many of the following conflicts between Sudarsono and armed
forces headquarters. In January and February 2005, Sudarsono issued
ministerial decrees that outlawed military services and their units from
procuring their own equipment.62 This decision had the potential to cut
deeply into the entrenched network of military officials and business
agents, and to put an end to some of the collusion that had marked the
procurement process. 
In practice, however, the decrees failed to address the underlying prob-
lems of the military procurement system, which uses well-connected
agents to pre-finance purchases that the state is unable to cover through its
actual budget. This mechanism has traditionally opened the door for
mark-ups and corruption, and this appears not to have changed.
Furthermore, the minister faced difficulties in advancing the civilianiza-
tion of his department, a process he had often mentioned as a crucial con-
dition for achieving effective control over the military. Although the
department had been officially separated from TNI headquarters in 1999,
active military officers had continued to occupy virtually all key positions
in the ministry. In March 2005, Sudarsono tried to appoint a civilian
adviser as director-general for planning of defense systems, but his candi-
dacy was opposed by the military and, ultimately, by Yudhoyono himself.63
Thus civilians remained marginal players in the ministry, largely posted to
work at the department’s research office or carry out administrative tasks.
Confronted with entrenched military interests both in his own
department and in the armed forces, Sudarsono decided that new,
groundbreaking legislation was needed. He revised his earlier position
that amendments to the State Defense Act were sufficient to place the
armed forces under the supervision of the Department of Defense. These
amendments were supposed to replace the existing arrangement that put
the military directly under the control of the president. Instead,
Sudarsono opted for the “big” solution. The minister declared that he
wanted to create umbrella legislation for all aspects of defense and secu-
rity, earning him praise from the 2005 Freedom House report for aiming
at a “major reorganization” of the security sector (Freedom House 2005:
296). With this, he intended not only to establish his department as the
primary executive control body for the armed forces, but also to settle a
variety of issues not regulated by existing laws. This included the rules
and norms for cooperation between the police and the military, the role
of a yet-to-be formed national security council, and the engagement of
the armed forces in military operations other than war. The draft for the
new legislation raised serious concerns among civil society groups who
feared that it would reunite the police and the military into one large,
New Order-style security agency.64
While these worries were unsubstantiated, Sudarsono had to tackle a
myriad of other problems related to the bureaucratic procedures of draft-
ing the bill. Most important, he had underestimated the complexity of
producing a draft bill in cooperation with other government departments
and agencies. As a bill on national security, the Department of Defense
had to include the Home Ministry, the Department of Justice, Foreign
Ministry, and the police in the deliberations. As a result, Sudarsono’s
announcement in February 2005 that the new bill would reach parliament
within “two months” turned out to be unrealistic.65 By early 2006, the bill
still had not made significant progress, with no submission date to
Parliament in sight. This delay has consolidated the status quo, with the
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armed forces still insisting that the Department of Defense does not yield
effective powers over TNI. 
The delay in reformulating the institutional relationship between the
Department of Defense and TNI headquarters also obstructed Sudarsono’s
second major policy initiative, the reform of military businesses. In the last
days of the Megawati administration, Parliament had passed the Armed
Forces Act, which included a paragraph that mandated the government to
take over all military businesses within five years. Shortly after his appoint-
ment, Sudarsono required TNI to sub-
mit an inventory of all enterprises,
foundations, and cooperatives run by
armed forces headquarters and its var-
ious units. TNI formally complied,
and Sutarto even announced that the
armed forces had decided to divest
their businesses not within five, but
within just two years. In the absence of
effective civilian control mechanisms,
however, TNI itself began to set the parameters for the planned handover.
Sutarto, for example, proclaimed that most of TNI’s 219 core businesses
(which had 1,520 subunits below them) were exempted from the transfer
plan because they were crucial for the welfare of soldiers. Sjafrie
Sjamsoeddin, secretary-general of the Department of Defense and himself
a three-star general, seconded Sutarto by stating that “if an enterprise is
run for internal and welfare purposes, it can’t be categorized as a busi-
ness.”66 Using this definition, TNI demanded that cooperatives and most
foundations be excluded from the takeover, and Sudarsono appeared to
offer no alternative interpretation. With 194 out of the main 219 enter-
prises being classified as cooperatives, the mandate of the Armed Forces
Act had been undermined by a simple semantic redefinition.67
In addition to creating loopholes, however, TNI also cut its formal
links with some of its most profitable businesses. The army foundation
Kartika Eka Paksi in August 2005 sold its share in the Artha Graha Bank,
which in the past had served as the major investment arm of the military.
Denying that the shares constituted a state asset, Deputy Army Chief of
Staff Endang Suwarya insisted that TNI was under no obligation to sur-
render the proceeds to the government, and that the military planned to
use the money for “educational” purposes instead.68 The sale, besides gen-
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erating no profit for the state treasury, will make it impossible for the gov-
ernment to treat Artha Graha investments as military assets. This is despite
the well-known fact that Artha Graha continues to manage many of TNI’s
foundations and enterprises. In addition to Artha Graha, the army also
tried to sell the airline owned by Kostrad, Mandala, before the government
could gain control over it. In
November 2005, an official from
the Ministry of State Enterprises
expressed concern over the extent
of “blood-letting” in the airline, in
other words a worrying level of
capital out-flow. He implied that
the longer the government worked
on verifying the list of companies
submitted by TNI, the more diffi-
cult it would become to assess their
real value.69 In April 2006, Kostrad
announced that it had sold Mandala to a private investor, but refused to
say what it would do with the 33 million dollars it received from the trans-
action.70 In short, the initially ambitious drive to tackle the problem of mil-
itary-owned businesses and close down TNI’s off-budget revenue sources
has already lost most of its steam. At this point, the outcome of the process
is still open, but it is unlikely to significantly alter the way the armed forces
raise large portions of their operational funds. 
The Inviolability of the Territorial Command System
The difficulties in pushing the process of military reform were aggravated
by the continued reluctance of the Indonesian elite to identify the territo-
rial command structure as a critical reform target. During the parliamen-
tary deliberations on the Armed Forces Act in mid-2004, some civilian
politicians wanted to include stipulations calling for the gradual break up
of the territorial system.71 In the end, however, the paragraph concerned
was watered down to such an extent that it was no longer legally binding. 
Even the tsunami in Aceh, which had exposed the weaknesses of the
territorial structure in the most brutal manner, failed to convince policy-
makers that the command system needed to be revamped. Having tradi-
tionally concentrated on maintaining a vast network of land-based micro-
units, the armed forces were overwhelmed when the natural disaster in
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Aceh required the rapid mobilization of airborne and maritime transporta-
tion units. Consequently, the army appeared paralyzed in the first two
weeks after the catastrophe, and was forced to call in foreign assistance to
provide the transportation services. These obvious deficiencies led some
within the government to consider strengthening the air force and the
navy, and Sudarsono announced in April 2006 that his department was
working on the design of a new defense system.72 Sudarsono’s call for a new
approach did not include a strategic critique of the territorial system, how-
ever. The unwillingness to question the compatibility of the structure with
international defense requirements and democratic standards was further
compounded by the decision in October 2005 to reactivate the intelli-
gence function of territorial units. After the second Bali bombing on
October 1, Sutarto declared that TNI would actively engage in the war
against terror by collecting intelligence through the lowest level of the ter-
ritorial system.73 In the weeks following the announcement, antiterror
desks were established at all local commands, processing the data received
from subordinate units. While the response of politicians and civil society
leaders was largely negative, TNI proceeded with its plans. With the terri-
torial command system integrated into the nationwide counterterrorism
apparatus, the possibility of reforming the latter appears increasingly
remote. Thus it came as no surprise when new TNI Commander Djoko
Suyanto reasserted at his parliamentary confirmation hearing in early
February 2006 that the territorial structure would remain in place under
his leadership, despite his background as an air force officer.
The entrenchment of the territorial system was all the more important
for TNI since the 2005 local elections had produced rather poor results for
candidates from a military background. Previously, retired military officers
had profited from the indirect electoral system, exploiting tensions
between political parties to offer themselves as compromise candidates.
Based on new electoral laws passed in October 2004, however, the heads
of local governments were to be elected directly by the people for the first
time in Indonesian history. Thus between June 2005 and April 2006,
around 235 local polls were held, with the rest occurring whenever the
term of an incumbent expires. In those ballots, active and retired officers
found themselves largely outplayed by influential bureaucrats and wealthy
businessmen. Nevertheless, eight percent of all candidates had a military
or police background, the fourth largest group in terms of professional ori-
gin (Mietzner 2005). Very few retired officers won the elections in their
respective areas, however, and none of the six active TNI representatives,
all of whom had been approved by Sutarto to run, was elected to office. 
The results raised serious doubts within the officer corps whether the
military would be able to defend its traditional grip on key governorships.
By early 2006, retired officers still held the governorships of Jakarta, Central
and East Java, South Sulawesi, and East Kalimantan (the governor of North
Sumatra, also a former general, died in a plane crash in September 2005
and was replaced by a civilian). All these areas will hold direct elections in
2007 and 2008, and more electoral losses for candidates with military back-
grounds are almost certain. In anticipation of this further reduction in for-
mal political influence, the armed forces are likely to seek the consolidation
of the territorial command system as the last bastion of military engage-
ment in local economies and their political networks.
Against this background, Yudhoyono’s handling of military reform has
received mixed reviews from Indonesian political commentators. On the
one hand, he has been widely praised for reining in the armed forces on the
Aceh issue, setting a historical precedent for military adherence to a negoti-
ated settlement with separatists. This achievement sets him apart from his
predecessors Habibie, Wahid, and Megawati, who all failed to secure mili-
tary support for their plans to resolve long-standing separatist conflicts
through peaceful means. On the other
hand, observers have been largely crit-
ical of the lack of efforts for structural
military reform. In a commentary on
the resumption of military ties with
the United States, Indonesia’s leading
English-language newspaper, Jakarta
Post, remarked in late November 2005
that  “over the past 12 months, very
little has actually been shown by Susilo
(that) he is still focused on his reform
pledges.” The paper pointed to “the difficulties faced by the civilian defense
minister in initiating real change” and warned that “providing carrots to a
TNI that remains lethargic about political reform only reinforces the belief
that their quiet subversion is paying dividends.”74 Such comments suggest
that despite the significant progress that Indonesia has made since 1998,
much more needs to be done to transform the armed forces into a modern,
effective, and depoliticized military that is firmly subordinated to demo-
cratic civilian control.
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Indonesia and the Problem of Second-Generation Military Reform
The discussion so far has pointed to the hybrid character of military
reform after Suharto’s fall. On the one hand, the armed forces have lost
much of their formal political influence, and they no longer act as the
backbone of the incumbent regime. On the other hand, the military has
successfully defended its territorial power base, maintained its autonomy
from institutional control, and exploited the fragmentation of civilian pol-
itics to gain political concessions. Scholars have approached such hybrid
political constellations in different ways. Some authors have introduced
the concept of “hybrid regimes,” in which the system of governance is nei-
ther democratic nor authoritarian (Karl 1995). Others have differentiated
between “electoral democracies,” in which free and fair elections are being
held but several deficiencies persist, and “liberal democracies,” which in
addition to free and fair elections also have a vibrant civil society, rule of
law, and democratic civilian control over the military (Howard and
Roessler 2006). In most recent discussions, authors like Diamond have
spoken of “low-quality democracies,” which fulfil all formal conditions for
a democratic state but lack supportive sociopolitical fundamentals such as
civilian supremacy over the armed forces (Diamond and Morlino 2004).
In such schemes, Indonesia would feature as an electoral democracy with
persisting structural shortcomings––or more derogatively, a “collusive
democracy” (Slater 2004: 91). Classifications like this are too broad, how-
ever, to identify the particular stage of Indonesia’s military reform efforts.
Consequently, other scholars have designed models more specifically
directed toward military reform processes in transitional states. As intro-
duced earlier, the two-generation model of civil-military reform developed
by Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster provides an analytical platform for
assessing progress toward democratic control over postauthoritarian mili-
taries. In this model, the first generation of military reforms is largely con-
cerned with institutional change, while the second generation consolidates
the capacity of both state institutions and civil society to exercise “securi-
ty sector governance.” Based on this definition and a number of qualita-
tive indicators, Cottey et al. evaluated the steps particular countries have
taken to achieve structural military reform. This evaluation allows for the
location of states on the scale of civil-military transitions. The highest level
of progress was reached by those states that had completed the first-gener-
ation reforms but experienced problems in implementing the second. At
the bottom of the scale, several states had not even started serious efforts to
address first-generation issues.
The application of this model to the case of Indonesia helps to high-
light both achievements and shortcomings in the process of military
reform. Many first-generation changes, mostly in the field of institutional
reorganization, were successfully implemented. Table 1 lists those first-gen-
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Table 1: Completed or Partly Completed First-Generation Military Reforms
Year Reform Status
1998 Withdrawal of active military personnel from civilian posts completed
1999 Separation of police from the armed forces completed
1999
Extensive electoral reforms, marginalizing the military from
formal politics
completed
1999 Declaration of political neutrality; withdrawal from Golkar completed
1999
Reorganization of Department of Defense and security into
Department of Defense
completed
1999 Appointment of civilian minister of defense completed
1999 Empowerment of Parliament vis-à-vis TNI partly completed
2000 Revocation of “Dual Function” doctrine completed
2000 Definition of external defense as TNI’s main task completed
2000
Disbandment of sociopolitical offices at the Department of
the Interior
completed
2000
Disbandment of military-coordinated domestic security
agency (Bakorstanas)
completed
2000 Passing of Law on Human Rights Courts completed
2002 Passing of State Defense Act completed
2004 Passing of Armed Forces Act completed
2004 Extraction of non-elected military members from Parliament completed
2004
Extraction of military faction from MPR; abolition of indi-
rect election of the president and local government heads
completed
2004 Subordination of military courts to the Supreme Court partly completed
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eration reform steps that have been completed or are in the final phase of
completion, contradicting the frequent argument that almost nothing has
changed in civil-military relations since Suharto’s fall. For example, the
electoral reforms carried out under the Habibie government in 1999
meant that the executive and legislative institutions overseeing the armed
forces were democratically legitimized. In 2004, further changes to the
electoral system saw the complete departure of TNI officers from
Parliament and the Assembly. Moreover, direct elections of national and
local government heads were introduced in 2004 and 2005 respectively,
abolishing the indirect election mechanism so prone to interference by the
military and other powerful elite groups. Parliament was formally empow-
ered to exercise control over the military, ranging from budget allocation
to defense planning. The Department of Defense was led by a succession
of civilian politicians for the first time since the 1950s, and the State
Defense Act of 2002 and the Armed Forces Act of 2004 handed it wide-
ranging authority over the strategic and logistical aspects of military man-
agement. Assembly decrees defined the role of the armed forces as being
focused on defense, while the police were separated from the military and
charged with maintaining internal security. Human rights courts were
established in 2000 to put security officers on trial for gross violations, and
the military court system was nominally placed under the supervision of
the Supreme Court. 
Despite these important changes, however, a number of critical items
were omitted from the first-generation reform agenda. As shown in Table 2,
crucial first-generation changes remained either unaddressed or incomplete.
Most important, Indonesia has been reluctant to remove what was widely
identified as the main obstacle to effective and sustainable military reform:
the army’s territorial command structure. The persistence of this command
system has allowed military self-financing to remain operational, with seri-
ous implications for the political and legal accountability of the armed
forces. Accordingly, the oversight exercised by both Parliament and the
Department of Defense was highly theoretical. For example, Paragraph 25
of the State Defense Act, which stipulated that the armed forces had to be
funded exclusively by the central state budget, was never––and indeed could
not be––enforced. Thus the armed forces continued to raise large parts of
their effective expenditure through the territorial network, enabling them to
maintain a significant financial autonomy from the state. 
The failure to tackle this single most important item on the first-gen-
eration reform agenda was aggravated by other problems typical of civil-
military transitions. Civilian defense officials lacked the expertise and
political clout to professionally review strategic, technical, and operational
questions of military management (Perwita
2004: 8). In addition, the continued politi-
cal relevance of the military discouraged
civilian politicians from seeking to exercise
their control function effectively. Instead,
they sought the support of the armed forces
to settle conflicts within the civilian elite. At
the same time, human rights courts acquit-
ted all officers indicted for violations in East
Timor and the 1984 massacre of Tanjung
Priok, extending what Robert Cribb (2002:
239) called the “triumphalist culture of impunity.” In summary, the insti-
tutions produced by the first generation of reforms, while equipped with
formal authority and legal instruments, often proved toothless when con-
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Table 2: Unaddressed or Incomplete First-Generation Reforms
Reform Status
Revision of territorial
command system
Blueprint developed, but reform aborted in 2001
Reduction of off-budget
military financing
Take-over of military businesses mandated, but
cooperatives and foundations likely to be excluded
Subordination of TNI to DoD TNI continues to report directly to the president
Civilian court jurisdiction for off-
duty offences by TNI members
Necessary regulations not yet passed
Strengthening of human
rights courts
No action taken after serial acquittals of senior
officers between 2003 and 2005
Civilianization of DoD staff Vast majority of DoD officials still military officers
Creation of civilian-led national
security council
Discussed since 2002, no concrete action taken
the support of the armed
forces to settle conflicts
within the civilian  elite
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fronted with the entrenched network of political relationships cultivated
by the armed forces.  
The incompleteness of the first-generation agenda undermined the
chances of designing substantial second-generation reforms. This phase
in the reform process, in which the newly created institutions are typical-
ly equipped with the capacity, skills, and resources to carry out their
functions properly, could proceed only very fragmentarily (see Table 3).
Without full state control over the military’s budget, for example, over-
sight by civilian agencies remains cursory. At the same time, the failure
to clearly subordinate the armed forces to the Department of Defense,
and to push the process of “civilianization” of the ministry forward, left
military officers with considerable freedom to manage their own affairs.
Similarly, the Supreme Court was hesitant to enforce its supervision of
military judges, allowing the armed forces to retain control over their
own justice system. Military judges did not discontinue their practice of
handing down light sentences for military personnel involved in gross
Table 3: Second-Generation Reforms and their Status in Indonesia
Reform Status
Full government and parliamentary con-
trol over military budget
Practice of partial military 
self-financing continues
Effective auditing of 
military expenditure
State auditors’ authority to scrutinize mili-
tary budgets still very limited
Regular, interagency reassessment of
threat situation and military structure
Threat assessment and force structure
determined by military elite
Transparent, credible military 
court system
Public perception of impunity for military
personnel persists
Professional, multi-layered procurement
process of military equipment
Network of military-connected agents still
dominant; corruption rampant
Full adherence of the military bureaucracy
to executive decisions
Gradually improving, but remains depen-
dant on the loyalty of individual officers
to the president
Existence of vibrant civilian 
defense community
Expanding, but often lacking resources
violations. (In April 2003, the main suspect in the murder of the leading
Papuan independence activist Theys Eluay was sentenced to three and
half years in jail, with then Army Chief of Staff Ryacudu calling the
defendant a “hero”). 
Given these deficiencies in institutional reform, it was not surprising
that second-generation reforms were mostly limited to the nongovernmen-
tal sector: the participation of civil society groups in drafting the State
Defense Bill in 2001, for instance, hinted at the development of what
Cottey et al. called a “civilian defense community.” In fact, by 2006 quite
a few think tanks had emerged that specialized in defense and security
affairs, and that engaged productively with the armed forces, Parliament,
and executive state agencies. Unfortunately, the increase of nongovernmen-
tal expertise in military matters was not matched by similar developments
in the formal institutions in charge of controlling the armed forces.
This combination of partial successes in first-generation reforms and
continued problems in organizing the transition to second-generation
changes has shaped the above-mentioned hybrid nature of post-1998 mil-
itary reform. As a result of successful first-generation reforms, the armed
forces arguably no longer hold a “veto power” through which they could
overturn key political decisions made by the electorate or the civilian gov-
ernment, with the possible exception of
specific policies in the security sector
(Stepan and Roberson 2004: 143).
However, the obvious successes in this
area were insufficient to subordinate the
armed forces firmly to democratic civil-
ian control. These difficulties were
caused by several factors highlighted
throughout this essay. To begin with,
the way the political transition occurred
prevented radical military reforms early
in the post-Suharto period. Senior mili-
tary officers had played a key role in the negotiations leading to Suharto’s
resignation, and in return they received concessions that preserved some
of the military’s institutional privileges. Equally important were the inter-
civilian conflicts that marked the political competition after 1998. The
fragmentation of the civilian elite reached its peak in 2001 during the
impeachment proceedings against President Wahid, and it is no coinci-
dence that military reform began to stagnate in that period. In the after-
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math of the failed Wahid presidency, the Indonesian elite increasingly
acquired a nationalist-conservative mindset that prioritized territorial
integrity over further military reform. Concerns over national disintegra-
tion, communal violence, and social unrest appeared to discourage polit-
ical decision-makers from weakening the security forces with additional
reform experiments. Consequently, crucial first-generation reforms,
which had not been tackled in the early period of the transition because
of the concessions that TNI had received for its role in the regime change,
continued to be ignored at later stages of the post-Suharto reform process.
The key elements of this analysis are confirmed by the application of
five explanatory propositions developed by Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster
to the case of Indonesia. These propositions were designed to illustrate
why some states succeed in their reform efforts and others do not. First,
the level of attachment of military leaders to the fallen autocracy is a deci-
sive factor. In post-Suharto Indonesia, the loyalty of the TNI elite toward
the old regime was considerably higher than in other countries where mil-
itary-backed regimes disintegrated, which led to serious problems in
implementing reforms. The second proposition relates to the state of dem-
ocratic politics. Although Indonesia’s post-1998 elite has largely accepted
democracy as the most viable political system, the level of conflict within
the elite over the norms of democratic interaction has been so high that
the general agreement on the basics of state organization did not result in
a deepening of the reform effort. Third, international factors can play an
important role in accelerating or delaying military reform. Unlike Turkey,
for example, which reformed its armed forces to gain entry into the
European Union, Indonesia had to fear no substantial financial losses if it
failed to pursue military reform. In fact, the post-September 11 security
environment even reduced the international pressure on TNI to reform.
Fourth, the depth of institutional change indicates the stability of the
reformist agenda. In Indonesia, the unwillingness to include the territori-
al command structure in the program of institutional reform increased the
“vulnerability of civil-military relations to the vagaries of domestic politi-
cal change” (Cottey et al. 2000: 3). Finally, the specific “military culture”
in Indonesia, nurtured by decades of self-financing, operational autono-
my, and legal impunity, proved unsupportive of fundamental changes to
the foundations of the armed forces.
The mixed results of its efforts to establish democratic control over the
armed forces grants Indonesia a medium ranking in the field of states with
comparable experiences of recent regime change (Herd and Tracy 2005).
Indonesia has fared better than a large number of countries that have not
even begun with their first generation of civil-military reforms, like sever-
al states in post-Soviet Central Asia or conflict-prone countries in sub-
Saharan Africa. Indonesia has also achieved more stable results than states
that addressed both first and second-generation reforms, but saw their
reform processes collapse due to the weakness of the state and renewed
conflicts. The states most similar to Indonesia as far as their current state
of civil-military relations is concerned are Ghana, Nigeria, Turkey, and
Russia. In those states, problems with the first generation of reforms per-
sist, and the armed forces remain a highly politicized and privileged insti-
tution despite formal changes to their organizational framework. Indonesia
lags behind states, however, that have seen successful first- and second-gen-
eration reforms while continuing to experience sporadic problems in the
process, like South Africa, Taiwan, or South Korea. Although this compar-
ative perspective helps to judge Indonesia’s progress in military reform
against international standards, the debate on institutional change within
TNI has to maintain its primary focus on the particular circumstances of
the world’s largest archipelagic state. 
Beyond the explanatory propositions applied in the theoretical litera-
ture, Indonesia faces very specific circumstances in its efforts to reform the
armed forces: the intrasystemic character of the 1998 regime change, the
protracted conflicts within civilian politics, and the persistence of the
uniquely structured territorial command system. These core problems of
military reform have shaped Indonesia’s process of democratic transition
since Suharto’s fall, and they will continue to play a significant role in the
years to come.
Policy Recommendations   
The analysis developed above presents tough challenges for both domestic
and international policymakers. The complexity of the issues at hand does
not allow for a quick fix, and standard solutions that may have worked in
other countries do not necessarily apply to
Indonesia. There are, however, a number of
steps that could be taken in order to revive the
stalled process of institutional military reform
and push Indonesia closer to the sort of sec-
ond-generation changes that other East Asian
countries like South Korea or Taiwan have
already begun. 
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In the domestic arena, decision-makers should conduct a comprehen-
sive defense review, involving the government, legislators, the armed
forces, the police, and the nongovernmental defense community. This
defense review should analyze the kind of threats that Indonesia will face
in the next twenty or thirty years, and subsequently design a defense sys-
tem that is best positioned to address this threat scenario. 
In the past, defense reviews in Indonesia have tended to confirm the
status quo, either because of vested interests within various security agen-
cies or sheer lack of resources to advance radical change. Given the fun-
damental shifts in the domestic and international security environment in
the last fifty years, however, it is difficult to see how a new Indonesian
defense review could recommend maintaining the defense system devel-
oped and perpetuated since the 1950s. The often advanced argument that
Indonesia can afford no other defense system than that based on its
allegedly low-cost territorial structure should be critically reviewed. The
overall costs of maintaining that system, from vast infrastructure expens-
es to the resources drawn out of local economies to sustain individual mil-
itary units, may well exceed the funds that would be needed to substan-
tially revamp Indonesia’s defense design. Independent think-tanks have
for some time argued that Indonesia needs to think about concentrating
its defense forces in a small number of multi-service bases established at
sensitive points across the archipelago (Widjajanto 2002). These bases
should have rapid deployment facilities, particularly sea- and airborne.
Whatever the precise outcome of the defense review, Indonesian policy-
makers should determine the parameters of the future defense system
sooner rather than later in order to be able to implement the changes in
the next ten to fifteen years.
Beside the long-term reform of the defense system, Indonesia’s politi-
cal elite should also work on completing several reforms that were either
left unaddressed or have not produced the expected results. The human
rights legislation should be equipped with stronger instruments to bring a
larger number of human rights violations to court, and the courts should
be provided with training and resources to carry out their tasks more effec-
tively. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which according to law
should have been established by 2005, should be created quickly and
needs to be given adequate funds and powers. In terms of institutional
military reform, the armed forces should be clearly subordinated to the
Department of Defense, and the “civilianization” of that department
should be accelerated considerably. The hand-over of military businesses to
the state should proceed according to the initial plans, and should not
exclude cooperatives and foundations. The State Auditing Board should be
granted authority to examine not only the official expenditures of the
armed forces (as had been its practice in the past), but also their off-budg-
et income sources. The creation of a civilian-led national security council,
which has been debated since 2002, should be finalized and given suffi-
cient resources to provide the government with critical, up-to-date, and
comprehensive input on defense and security issues. Equally important,
however, is that civilian political actors continue to be strengthened. The
consolidation of political parties, legislative institutions, and executive
agencies is a conditio sine qua non for the development of a democratically
controlled defense sector. If intra-civilian conflicts can be reduced, and
political parties stick to democratic rules in competing for power, the
chances for successful military reform will be much higher than under the
conditions of deep social fragmentation in 2001. 
Foreign governments that wish to support Indonesia’s military reform
process should be aware that their actions are unlikely to have a strong
impact on domestic policy decisions. This applies both to possible sanc-
tions and to support programs. In terms of
sanctions, there is generally no evidence
that would suggest that isolating a foreign
military leads to positive behavioral
changes or substantial structural reforms.
If anything, the sanctions imposed on
Indonesia by Western countries after 1999
have hardened the nationalist resolve with-
in the officer corps, and have encouraged
it to seek closer ties with emerging powers
that have fewer concerns over human
rights issues, like China or Russia. 
The only period when Western governments would have had enough
leverage to push for structural military reform was the economic crisis from
1997 to around 2000, when the country depended on regular cash injec-
tions to survive. Back then, however, the International Monetary Fund and
the World Bank prioritized reforms to the banking sector and other eco-
nomic fields, and paid little attention to security sector reform. Today,
Indonesia is in a much stronger position, economically and politically, and
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is unlikely to respond well to any further sanctions related to the state of
its military. Thus instead of imposing sanctions, foreign governments are
better advised to engage with TNI, but they should keep their expectations
low as far as the impact of their assis-
tance programs is concerned.
Educational exchanges, training work-
shops, language courses, and financial
support for reform-oriented initiatives
are useful interventions, but the effects
of such efforts should not be overesti-
mated. Donors should be designing
their programs in full awareness of
their limitations, and focus on realistic
benchmarks rather than ideal goals.
The important decisions on structural
reform, such as the defense review mentioned above, are for Indonesians
to make, and they are more likely to be the result of domestic political
dynamics than foreign pressure or assistance. 
What foreign donors can do, however, is expose Indonesian military
officers and civilian defense officials to international debates on security
issues, enriching their knowledge and enabling them to reach well-
informed decisions. Generals who speak English, communicate regularly
with international colleagues, read up-to-date contributions on defense
studies, and have traveled widely are more likely to be interested in reforms
than those who are inward-looking and isolated from international affairs.
General Ryamizard Ryacudu, who often stated that Indonesia’s military
was unique and thus did not need to seek international advice on its
reform agenda, was an eloquent example of the latter type. In addition to
educational programs, foreign donors can play a role in providing assis-
tance to civil society organizations and think tanks engaged in the defense
sector. These pillars of the nongovernmental defense community are often
crucial in driving reform initiatives, and thus deserve institutional support.
Indonesian academics should be given scholarships to study at defense
academies in the United States, Europe, and Australia, in order to create a
new generation of civilians with expertise in defense studies. Graduates of
such courses could then, at a later stage, fill positions at the Department
of Defense that are currently still occupied by military officers. Finally, for-
eign governments might also consider very limited equipment support to
The important decisions on
structural reform…are more
likely to be the result of
domestic political dynamics
than foreign pressure
b
Indonesia’s armed forces, provided that such assistance helps Indonesia to
shift its doctrinal focus away from the army towards the navy and air force,
and does not (at this point) include lethal weaponry. The supply of mili-
tary equipment to Indonesia is likely to trigger heated debates in some
countries, particularly the United States and Australia, but if Jakarta is
expected to revamp its defense system and modernize its force structure, it
will ultimately need the material infrastructure to do so.
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